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1. Introduction 
The U.S. faith-based non-governmental organization (FBO) sector has experienced a 
dynamic increase in the last 70 years in both sheer number and financial power. In 2005 
alone, these organizations allocated over $6 billion to various projects relating to 
international development (McCleary 2009). Aid delivery by non-state actors is justified 
by the popularly held notion that FBOs deliver services to those most in need. Moreover, 
due to their calling by a higher power, scholars and aid practitioners assume the increased 
activity in the faith base sector is warranted. With their foundation rooted in theological 
principles and justified by tenants of faith, these organizations have the capacity both to 
do good and be immune by the strategic interests that plague official development 
assistance (ODA) (Smith 1999). However, there is anecdotal evidence to support that 
donors are not always as altruistic as they may claim to be, calling our assumption into 
question (Maren 1997; Hancock 1994).  A closer examination may reveal differing 
underlying motives for identifying aid recipients.  
This research will examine a relatively uncharted area: donation patterns of U.S. 
FBOs working in international development at the recipient country level. As government 
partnership with FBOs grows, we not only have increased motivation, but also a 
responsibility, to examine the geographic mapping of aid commitments. I hypothesize 
that the religious demography of the aid recipient country, as well as recipient need, plays 
an important role in attracting FBOs.  Aid commitments will be more likely when the 
donor-recipient dyad share a common faith. Through analysis of a unique dataset and 
interviews with development practitioners, this honors project will examine the drivers of 
aid allocation for FBOs, including not only need and religious demography, but also the 
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effects of total annual revenue, religious affiliation, and receiving funding from the US 
government. 
1.1 Background: The growth of private aid 
 While private aid groups, NGOs, and charities have existed for long periods of 
time, only recently have these groups gained high levels of public visibility and 
achievement of a critical niche in official aid delivery (Smillie 1997). Several factors 
have come together in the last 30 years to create a perfect environment to foster the 
growth and globalization of the FBO sector. First, the decrease in US official aid has 
created a new space for non-state actors, including faith-based groups, to enter the 
development arena. US foreign aid allocations have experienced significant decreases 
through the last 50 years, from the high of $18.5 billion (Figure 1). Seventy percent of 
money flowing from the US to the developing world was public funds in 1970 (USAID 
2006). In contrast, aid allocations of the last 10 years have trended around $10 billion 
dollars, with 85% of the monetary flow from the US to the developing world originating 
from non-public sources (USAID 2006).1 This inversion, while due in part to remittances 
and foreign direct investment, was largely attributed to both the growth of private aid 
groups and diminishing official aid. To substitute for the lack of federal funds, the US has 
worked to foster public-private partnerships through contracts and grants with the NGO 
sector.  
                                                           
1
 This statistic of non-public sources does include USAID grants and contracts. However, the important 
distinction is that this money is delivered by private actors, not the US government. 
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Figure 1. US Public and FBO Aid Allocation in billions of dollars. Sources: US foreign aid allocation from 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, FBO data from USAID PVO registry 
Secondly, recent changes in executive policy have supported the continuing 
divergence of US aid in comparison to private aid. Presidential administrations have 
supported the expansion of the FBO sector through executive policy. Development 
assistance was pushed to the forefront of US foreign policy following September 11, 
2001. Foreign aid was promoted to one of the three pillars of US national security, on 
equal footing with both military defense and diplomacy (USAID 2002). This policy 
served as a recognition of the key changes in private aid that were already underway. 
Additionally, the role of faith-based groups within the third pillar of national security was 
formally recognized. The Bush Administration established the Office of Faith-based and 
Community Initiatives in January 2001, ushering in a new era of government 
collaboration with humanitarian aid groups. Subsequent changes followed within USAID 
to form new programs aimed at increasing FBO participation in existing programs 
through the Center for Faith-based and Community Initiatives. These changes have 
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translated into increased activity within the FBO sector, as seen in Figure 1. In 2005 
alone, FBOs budgeted $ 6.2 billion dollars of aid for international programs. 
Religious organizations were uniquely positioned in comparison to their secular 
counterparts to capitalize on these changes. The transition from exclusively religious to a 
broader, public role as non-governmental organizations was logical for many of 
established groups. The move to be recognized as NGOs by the US and international 
bodies is often is only a legal procedure, allowing religious groups to continue their 
existing work in humanitarian aid and development. Berger notes that, “unlike secular 
NGOs, most of which have been created in the last 30 years, many FBOs represent new 
incarnations of previously established religious organizations” (Berger 2003, 19-20). 
Religious NGOs officially affiliated with a denomination have access to an organized 
structure with worldwide reach. The global presence of religious organizations provides 
ample opportunities to spread their mission statement and abstract funding (Berger 2003).  
Additionally, these groups often have members located around the world, making an 
international, public mission a natural extension.   
1.2 Advantages of FBOs 
From the US government point of view, a public-private partnership offers many 
advantages. First, it is a financially prudent move. NGOs, both faith-based and secular, 
are “assumed cost-effective” in their outreach (Nancy and Yontcheva 2006, 5). Contracts 
and grants allow the federal government to minimize the number of federal employees on 
payroll (USAID 2002, 141). Likewise, NGOs can “conduct programs often faster and 
more efficiently than contractors or government employees.”  
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It also makes political sense. As private entities, NGOs can bypass political 
divisiveness and red tape to work directly with the local peoples (USIP 2003, 7). 
Qualitative research supports that NGOs are able to circumvent government bureaucracy 
to deliver aid directly to those in need (Tyndale 2006). The federal government can avoid 
possible political implications of failed programming.  This is a particular advantage 
when working in countries with high levels of corruption, dictators, etc (Nancy and 
Yontcheva 2006, 5-6). 
FBOs have particular advantages that appeal to the federal government. These 
advantages set FBOs apart from their secular and corporate counterparts. First, religious 
organizations have a built-in, “ready-made constituency” consisting of their co-religious 
(Dicklitch and Rice 2004, 662). In a personal interview, the president of a FBO noted that 
his organization’s faith affiliation allows them to “speak the same language” as the aid 
recipients.2  
Moreover, in conflict situations, the religious network is often the only remaining 
semblance of civil society after conflict or natural disaster.3 This asset allows church 
based organizations to “play a significant role in organizing negotiations, a role 
governments mostly can’t play” (Van de Veen  2002, 171). Wendy Tyndale notes that 
religious groups often gather for weekly services, providing a consistent way to reach 
local peoples and deliver a message for programming (Tyndale 2006, 169). For example, 
Catholic Relief Services (CRS) has utilized the Catholic Church’s existing infrastructure 
as a framework to deliver aid in post-conflict situations, such as working through the 
                                                           
2
 Craig Cole, President and CEO of Five Talents, phone conversation, February 5, 2010.  
3
 Government 491 Seminar Class, Guest Speaker on Microfinance, October 17, 2008. 
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diocese in East Timor to support their peace building and reconciliation efforts (CRS 
2002, 184). 
Secondly, a church or faith-based identity forms as an automatic association between 
donors and recipients. Religious congruency between donor and recipient built on a 
shared sense of values translate across cultural and socioeconomic barriers. This may 
work to the advantage of both donors and recipients. According to Norwegian Church 
Aid, practitioners were able to build relationships and trust with the local peoples due to 
their “church based identity” (Van de Veen  2002, 171).  Based on this relationship, faith-
based organizations have the unique ability to “to operate in politically sensitive 
situations” (USAID 2002).  In developing countries, the people have greater trust for 
religious institutions over governmental institutions. For example, a 2007 Gallup poll 
reported 82% of Sub-Saharan Africans trust religious organizations. In comparison, only 
57% of respondents trust the national government.4 In these places, faith affiliation gives 
“instant credibility” to FBOs. 5 
1.3 Criticism of FBOs 
The rise of FBOs has not been without controversy. First, recognition of FBO’s 
capacity to both unite and divide is necessary. While a common faith may create an 
automatic identification with local people, this has the potential to violate the principles 
of impartiality and neutrality. Religion is a basis for collective identity and thus 
“distinguishes the ‘in’ group from the ‘out’ group, the ‘we’ from the ‘you’: it is both 
                                                           
4
“Few Ethiopians Confident in their Institutions,” Gallup, January 30 2008,  
http://www.gallup.com/poll/104029/few-ethiopians-confident-their-institutions.aspx 
5
 Paul Krizek, Executive Director/General Counsel of Christian Relief Services, Phone Conversation, 
February 24, 2010.  
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inclusive and exclusive” (Van de Veen  2002, 252). For example, citizens of Rwanda 
criticized Catholic Relief Services’ plans to create an inter-religious forum. Local peoples 
were skeptical that the identifiable organization could be truly unbiased and uneasy of the 
true motives underlying the organization’s involvement in the area (USIP 2001, 5). 
Others criticize FBOs, noting that “many faith-based groups embrace a justice agenda 
and, while not necessarily choosing sides in a given conflict, do not make the principle of 
neutrality their first and greatest commandment” (Ferris 2005, 319). 
Religious groups exude a unique, moral based power that has the potential to be 
used to further a “self serving bias” and control behavior of those they aim to serve 
(Groves and Hinton 2003, 59). Some scholars even have more forceful language 
suggesting that NGOs have the ability to “harness” religious support for the “agenda they 
wish to impose” (Tyndale 2006, 165). Consider the case of World Help, an evangelical 
charity. Following the 2004 Tsunami in Indonesia, World Help mobilized quickly, 
making plans to find adoptive homes in a Christian orphanage for 300 Indonesian 
orphans. Not only did this place evangelism efforts over relief efforts, but it also violates 
the domestic law that requires adoptive parents and child to be of the same faith.6 As a 
consequence, the actions of World Help “led to questioning and criticism for the work of 
all Christians” in Indonesia (Ferris 2005, 323). 
Religious groups, out of principle, may not deliver certain services or deliver 
them in a certain fashion. For example, in Jordan, Islamic Charitable Association 
discriminated against those who preferred to remain unmarried based on religious views 
                                                           
6
 Alan Cooperman, “Tsunami Orphans won’t be sent to Christian homes,” January 14 2005, The 
Washington Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A7535-2005Jan13.html 
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(Benthall and Bellion-Jourdan 2003, 102). Various social issues also elicit a strong 
response from some FBOs. While US policy towards HIV/AIDS includes the ABC 
approach (abstinence, be faithful, use a condom,) various faith-based Christian 
organizations voiced dissent, citing contrary religious based teachings (Anderson 2008, 
21-24).  
Specific criticism applies to FBOs working in areas with religious based conflict. 
There is no scholarly consensus on the role of religion as a root cause of conflict. Some, 
such as Samuel Huntington emphasizes the role of religion (in his seminal work Clash of 
Civilizations,) as a key factor for future conflict (1996). Others, such as David Smock , 
contend that religious differences mask the true root causes, such as economic disparities, 
resource management, and political stability (2004). Regardless, the introduction of a 
religious variable into volatile situation may be polarizing, transforming a humanitarian 
agency to a bellicose agent. FBOs must take extreme precautions when functioning in 
“zone of religious conflict,” separating themselves from the root causes of violence 
(USIP 2001, 5).  
Others argue that secular NGOs may be hesitant to collaborate with FBOs, or vice 
versa. Local governments and other secular and international NGOs may be less likely to 
work with a faith-based organization, fueling interagency competition and coordination 
problems.7 FBOs themselves may contribute to a lack of coordination by choosing to 
only associate with religious based organizations. MCC in Africa chose to work with 
Presbyterian, Lutheran and United Methodist organizations exclusively in order not to 
                                                           
7
 Government 491 Seminar Class, Guest Speaker on Microfinance, October 17, 2008.  
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compromise the religious nature of their development work (Dicklitch and Rice 2004, 
668). 
Coordination issues may be due to the level of professionalism of the staff of 
FBOs. Twenty-five organizations in the dataset of interest have religious based 
restrictions for hiring employees and/or volunteers. World Vision requires all to adhere to 
statements of faith and/or Apostle’s Creed, promising adherence to the Christian faith8. In 
personal interviews with World Vision staff in Zimbabwe, researchers found that 
employees and volunteers tended to view the world as consisting of two groups of 
people: evangelized and un-evangelized. In addition, staff associated the developing 
world with un-evangelized peoples and vice versa (Bornstein 2006, 671). The work of 
FBOs is viewed through a lens of not only development, but also “exposure to 
Christianity” for World Vision staff (Bornstein 2005). FBOs with hiring stipulations tend 
to employ staff with religious convictions, but lack the rigorous training necessary, 
assigning substantial weight to references by pastors or religious leaders. Aid delivery 
with good intention may result in unintentional negative outcomes. Moreover, good 
intention is not a substitute for professionalism, experience, and knowledge. 
Non-Christian FBOs have not escaped criticism. Islamic humanitarian groups 
have faced the added burden as the subject of “witch hunts,” intensifying after the 
February 26, 1993 attack on the World Trade Center. Numerous groups, including 
Islamic Relief, became the focus of investigations by Western governments and others, 
such as Muslim Aid, were forced to close (Bellion-Jourdan 2006). This point is further 
                                                           
8
 World Vision, “Job Opportunities at World Vision.” http://www.worldvision.org/content.nsf/about/hr-
home 
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emphasized by the recent conviction of members of the Holy Land Foundation.9 Links 
between Islamic aid groups and terrorist organizations, whether alleged or factual, 
continue to create an issue with reputations of Muslim humanitarian groups (USIP 2003, 
3). 
To what extent are these criticisms valid? Is the entire faith-based sector only 
working to further their religious message? Or are these organizations receptive to 
recipient need? What are the true motivators of the sector? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
9
 Carrie Johnson, “Muslim Charity’s Ex-Leaders Convicted: Justice Nets 2 wins as Embassy Blast Verdicts 
Endure,” The Washington Post, November 25, 2008, A Section.   
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2. Literature Review 
2.1 Official Development Aid (ODA)  
Official development aid (ODA) has been the focus of both theoretical and 
empirical academic research for decades. ODA literature is divided between two main 
schools of thought: cynics and altruists (Buthe 2009). Theoretical work by Morganthau 
(1962) provided the first theoretical framework to assess of the role of foreign aid in the 
international system. Quantitative studied followed suit. Initial research determined 
recipient needs alone, as measured by per capita income levels (Dudley and 
Montmarquette 1976), life expectancy, and caloric intake (McKinlay and Little 1977) to 
be poor predictors for geographic distribution of foreign aid.10  Scholars began to 
question: if not recipient need, what are the drivers of foreign aid? 
Research has focused on three main components of donor interests: military, 
economic, and political. Some argue that economic incentives alone trump other factors. 
Measures of economic need used include exports (Neumayer 2003) and trade with other 
countries (Carleton and Stohl 1987). Others have focused on strategic measures of 
defense. Maizels and Nissanke (1984), Apodaca and Stohl (1999), and Poe et al. (1994) 
measure military presence in terms of arms transfers , US military personnel in a country, 
and US military presence dummy, respectively. These studies conclude that strategic 
factors outweigh recipient need as the determining factor in aid allocation.  
Building on this work, scholars incorporated broader measures of political 
strategy into allocation models. In their analysis of US foreign aid, Allesina and Dollar 
                                                           
10
 See work by Neumayer (2003) and  Easterly (2002) for additional information 
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(2000) find that US donations are biased toward the Middle East and other political allies 
(as measured by the originally constructed variable ‘UN Friend,’ which captures UN 
voting similarity) in comparison to other tactical variables. Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 
(2007) model aid allocation primarily as a function of “survival of political leaders” in 
both the donor and recipient country. The “aid for policy theory” largely ignores standard 
regressors and development indicators in favor of domestic coalition sizes, alignment 
with the US (the ‘tau b’ original measure), polity scores, and indicators available to the 
political leadership.  
Recent research has used a combination of various measures of donor interest in 
conjunction with recipient need to specify the most complete allocation models. Younas 
(2008) incorporates measures of natural resources as a measure of potential wealth. 
Additionally, he builds on previous literature and combines various military, economic, 
and political variables, finding that “political and strategic concerns” surpass “economic 
gains in terms of donor strategic allocation,” with US aid going to Egypt and Israel 
regardless of the amount to gain economically by committing to deliver aid elsewhere. 
Berthelemy and Tichit (2004) find similar results for Egypt.11 Still others contest that the 
aid as a policy and economic tool argument is too simple of a conclusion. Research by 
Loud, Nielson and O’Keefe studies US aid allocations to Muslims states (2008). The 
research suggests that a combination of strategic factors are at play, including terrorism, 
government preferences, and alliances as significant predictors of US aid allocation and 
project counts.  
                                                           
11
 Israel was not included in their dataset 
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Altruist scholars have used similar measures of donor interest but concluded 
measures of recipient need outweigh donor interests.  Econometric modeling techniques 
have supported the hypotheses that aid does indeed flow to the countries that need it the 
most (as measured by GDP per capita, Physical Quality of Life Index, proportion of 
population living in poverty), in comparison to donor interests. A handful of scholars 
support this finding for aid flows from the European Community (Tsoutsoplides 1991) 
and OECD countries (Noel and Therien 1995; Lumsdaine 1993), but no research exists to 
support this hypothesis for US foreign aid. 
It is not clear how much previous research of US official aid allocation applies to the 
private actors working in the international system, with varying degrees of intermingling 
with the state in terms of funding.  Arguably, a portion of the theoretical arguments once 
exclusively for official aid may applicable to the private sector due to the high amounts 
of government contracts and grants. State actors and private aid are not mutually 
exclusive. The US is reliant on private groups from an aid delivery point of view. 
Likewise, many ‘private’ organizations are dependent on the federal government to 
operate and quasi-state NGOs have emerged (Nancy and Yontcheva 2006). For example, 
over 50% of Catholic Relief Services’ annual revenue is from the US government.  
2.2 NGO Aid Allocation Research 
The growth of the NGO sector is a fairly recent trend. It follows then that the level 
scholarly attention and evaluation of ODA has not yet been paid to private aid. Only 
recently have scholars applied quantitative techniques to private aid allocations to 
developing countries. In the first study of its kind, Nancy and Yontcheva (2006) use nine 
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years of data to show that NGO projects co-financed by the EU are driven by poverty and 
life expectancy, with state donor interest variables, such as militarization, imports from 
the EU, EU official aid, and political score as insignificant overall. In terms of 
motivation, this initial research indicates, “NGOs do better” at identifying recipients 
based on need, rather than strategic interests, in comparison to ODA (Nancy and 
Yontcheva 2006, 3). Measures of militarization and political freedoms indicate that EU 
backed NGOs favor working in freer, less militarized environments. Additionally, NGOs 
remain independent of the preferences of their back-donors, with official EU 
development aid remaining statistically insignificant throughout hypothesis testing. 
Building on this groundbreaking empirical research, Koch et al. (2008) provides 
added evidence to support that private aid is allocated to countries with the most need. 
Analysis is based on self-reported allocation data of 98 of the largest international NGOs 
from OECD countries, including the US, UK, Netherlands, and Switzerland. Their 
findings support the hypothesis that private aid organizations allocate funds to the 
countries with the highest need, in terms of poverty, human development, and economic 
inequality for the allocation stage. Additional variables are added to measure cultural 
similarity, in the form of dummy variables to indicate shared religion between the 
majority of the recipient country and the donor. Shared religion is a significant motivator 
when selecting recipient countries. NGOs prefer to work in countries where the donor 
country has close political ties (as measured by UN voting record). In contrast to Nancy 
and Yontcheva (2006), measures of official aid are found to be significant motivators. 
Not only do NGOs follow official aid, but also the research finds that NGOs follow other 
NGOs, creating a “clustering effect.” 
15 
 
New research in the field of nonprofit location theory relies on logistical, 
psychological, and structural components of individual organizations and donors (such as 
proportion of public-private revenue, location of foreign offices, etc.) to explain country 
selection (Koch 2007).  Four factors, deemed “centripetal forces,” encourage 
concentration of NGOs: “internal economies of scale, external economies, a thick labor 
market, and blame sharing effects.” On the other hand, four different, “centrifugal forces” 
are at work for or the opposite effect: “avoiding competition, dispersion of demand, 
reputation effects, high transportation costs.” 
Using organizational theory as the framework for evaluation, the geographic 
distribution of aid is not as altruistic as suggested by these two empirical studies. 
Research indicates that country level clustering of aid remains persistent, with some 
countries overwhelmed by aid workers (for example, Kenya), leaving others neglected. 
Researchers deem Zambia, Nicaragua, Malawi, and El Salvador “donor darlings,” while 
Nigeria, Central African Republic, India, and Moldova remain “donor orphans.” (Koch 
2007). The “blind spots” of aid are attributed to the concentration of NGOs in areas with 
other NGOs or official donors. 
 Forthcoming research by Buthe et al. tests an alternate measure of donor interest. The 
researchers hypothesize that US based NGOs are more likely to allocate funds to 
countries with higher media attention. Selecting prominent locations could translate into 
more visible projects and effective fundraising for the NGO.  Using self-reported 
financial information, research indicates there is no evidence to support that countries 
with more media coverage garner more aid from NGOs. The research rejects the cynical 
argument in favor of altruistic measures of recipient need, including (including GDP per 
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capita, Human Development index, and the share of the population living below the 
poverty line). US based NGOs are also more attracted to recipient countries as the 
percentage of Christians increases. In summary, the three existing quantitative studies of 
NGO aid allocation conclude that NGOs are driven by primarily by measures of recipient 
need. 
2.3 Assumptions of the literature.  
Only a handful of scholars have studied private aid flows from the US to 
developing countries (Nancy and Yontcheva 2006; Koch 2007; Koch et al. 2008; Koch 
2009; Buthe et al. 2009). Not only are NGOs largely ignored in previous research, 
scholars discount the diversity that exists within the private aid sector. While trailblazers 
of this field have added significantly to our understanding of private aid allocation, FBOs 
remain an uncharted area of research  
Three damaging flaws are seen in previous research. First, scholars of NGO aid 
allocation ignore newer, smaller aid groups, biasing samples towards large, established 
groups. Koch (2009) requires organizations to reach a threshold of €10 million 
(approximately $12.5 million dollars in 2005) of annual revenue to be contacted for 
inclusion in the sample. In practice, the smallest US based NGO included is Oxfam USA 
with annual revenue of $73 million in 2008.  By establishing a threshold, the researcher 
implicitly makes the assumption that smaller groups will follow suit. This introduces a 
problem. Small groups are more constrained financially. The decisions they make in 
where to work may be more telling in revealing true preferences, in comparison to larger 
groups that have the resources, contacts, and partnerships to work all over the world. 
Biasing samples toward larger organizations will also include disproportionate number of 
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older, established groups (since revenue is positively correlated with age of 
organizations). Buthe et al. (2009) exclusively studied established and well known aid 
organizations, and identified the most influential US NGOs involved in emergency relief, 
water, health, and education through expert surveys.  Large, established groups tended to 
make “safer” choices, since the reputation is riding on success. On the other hand, 
smaller groups may feel need to take risks and work in more dangerous environments in 
order to distinguish themselves from other groups and attract private donors. 
Secondly, previous research is biased towards NGOs that receive government 
grants and funding. Nancy and Yoncheva (2006) exclusively examine NGOs with EU co-
financed projects and omit all projects in which donors utilize only private funds. This 
obvious bias results in findings that are only applicable to NGOs that are open to working 
with the government to some degree. Of the thirteen US based organizations included in 
Koch (2009), seven are registered with USAID as Private Voluntary Organizations 
(PVO). Of those registered with the US government, all receive some sort of government 
grants, contracts, or assistance. Likewise, of the 41 US based organizations included in 
Buthe et al. (2009), 32 are registered with USAID as PVOs. Of those 32 registered 
organizations, 27, or 84%, have a financial relationship with the federal government. 
While federal contracts and grants are rigid and stipulated for specific programs and 
expenses, private funding is flexible. Organizations with varying proportions of public to 
private funding may act differently, according to back-donor wishes.  
Third, research does not distinguish between secular and faith-based NGOs. All 
three empirical studies include FBOs, but assume that secular and faith-based groups 
work in the same manner and have similar motivations. Of the thirteen US based NGOs 
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included in Koch (2009), two are faith-based: Adventist Development and Relief Agency 
(ADRA) and World Vision USA.  Of the forty-one US based NGOs included in Buthe et 
al. (2009), nine are faith-based: Adventist Development and Relief Agency (ADRA), Aga 
Khan Foundation, American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, American Jewish 
World Service, Catholic Medical Mission Board, Catholic Relief Services, Lutheran 
World Relief, World Relief, and World Vision USA.  
Insert Table 1. About here 
There is empirical data to call this assumption into question, in both the 
geographic distribution and the types of projects supported. In terms of where secular and 
faith-based NGOs work, FBOs are more likely to work in Latin America in comparison 
to secular organizations (Table 1). Note that the geographic pattern of country 
commitments by FBOs follows the worldwide distribution of Christians.12  
Insert Table 2. About here 
Field research indicates that there are significant differences in the projects taken 
on by secular and faith-based groups (Flanigan 2010). As Table 2 depicts, secular groups 
are 10% more likely to finance capacity-building projects in comparison to their 
religiously affiliated counterparts. On the other hand, FBOs are 5% and 10% more likely 
to finance health and humanitarian assistant projects, respectively (Table 2).  
Additionally, within-country analysis and case studies have determined that there 
are significant differences in the means of operation of secular and faith-based groups. 
Case studies have found discrepancies of service delivery and geographic allocation of 
project selection for specific countries (Sri Lanka (Flanigan 2009), Bangladesh 
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 I define country commitment as the number of FBOs involved in a particular country. This methodology 
assigns equal weight to the activities of each FBO. 
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(Candland 2000); Bosnia (Flanigan 2009; Leban 2003), Lebanon (Flanigan 2009), Sudan 
(Mans and Ali 2006), and Chad (Kaag 2008)). Aggregating faith-based and secular 
donors together in the analysis assumes that all donors are motivated by the same factors. 
Scholars have not considered faith-based group’s unique motivating factors, and the goals 
and values that drive where they select to work. 
Why have religious groups been largely ignored by the academic literature? 
According to Berger, FBOs have been overlooked due to the lack of definition of “faith-
based,” the hesitation of the organizations themselves to acknowledge and embrace their 
religious character due to public stigma, and as a possible inhibitor to receiving 
government funding. The lack of data about FBOs emphasizes a “long-standing trend in 
the social and political science literature to overlook the role of religious actors in the 
public sphere” (2003). Others go further to describe religious groups as “invisible” in 
comprehensive discussions of foreign aid and assistance (Hearn 2002). 
The growth of the FBO sector mandates academic attention. Increased public-
private partnerships, faith-based initiatives and decline of US official development aid 
has created an environment which allows these groups act under the third pillar of US 
foreign policy. Thus, as a de facto arm the state, actions of FBOs have important 
implications for US foreign policy. It is particularly important to study the geographic 
tendencies of this sector, as it impacts the role of the US in international development. 
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3. Methodology 
3.1 Definitions 
To begin this assessment, a definition of FBOs must be provided. In general, 
NGOs are characterized by their autonomy from the state, acting as “networks of 
citizens” with an “explicitly public agenda” (Berger 2003). Specifically, FBOs are 
characterized as having one or more of the following: “affiliation with a religious body, 
financial support from religious sources, a mission statement with explicit reference to 
religious values, and/or a governance structure where selection of board members of staff 
is based on religious affiliation” (Ferris 2005, 312-313).  
 It is important to note an important distinction between faith-based and religious 
organizations. “Faith-based” is a looser definition than “religious organizations,” as 
FBOs may be active in “providing religious services” for the affiliated, but are not 
confined to exclusively religious activities. Thus, FBO is a blanket term that encompasses 
a wide range of organizations, from Global Health Action and Habitat for Humanity who 
are based loosely on Christian values, to Christian Mission Aid whose approach to 
development is explicitly rooted in religious values, focusing on preaching, church 
planting, and evangelization. 
NGOs take on a specific roles and responsibilities in humanitarian work. 
Humanitarianism is guided by the principles of humanity, impartiality, neutrality, and 
independence with an emphasis on helping those whose need is the greatest.13  While 
there is diversity between the faith affiliation of FBOs, goals, and sources of funding, 
many organizations share common core values. Strategies, such as the Do No Harm 
                                                           
13
 Government 491 Seminar Class, Guest Speaker on Humanitarian Aid, September 5, 2008. 
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Approach are the industry gold standard for methods of operation (Anderson 1999). 
Many NGOs have also signed on to the Red Cross and Red Crescent Code of Conduct for 
Humanitarian Work (Ferris 2005). These codes of conduct outline how organizations 
should operate overseas to ensure that the aid recipient is the first priority.  
FBOs were identified for inclusion in the dataset by registration with USAID as a 
PVOs. All organizations included in this dataset fit the following definition put forth by 
USAID:  
A U.S. PVO is a nonprofit, U.S.-based nongovernmental organization (NGO) that 
is incorporated and headquartered in the United States, solicits and receives cash 
contributions from the U.S. general public, is exempt from Federal income taxes 
under Section 501 (C) (3) of the Internal Revenue Code, and conducts, or 
anticipates conducting, program activities that are consistent with the general 
purposes of the Foreign Assistance Act and/or Public Law 480. (see 22CFR203.2) 
14
 
 
In addition, USAID requires eight categories of compliance for registration: 
1. US Based headquarters,  
2. private and non-governmental organization,  
3. 501(c)(3) registered with the IRS, and a mission not “organized primarily for 
religious purposes,”  
4. conducts business and activities overseas,  
5. has a board of directors that meet specifications,  
6. financial viability,  
7. spends no more than 40% of funds on supporting services, 
8. and general eligibility, which encompasses the requirements of non-terrorist 
activities.15 
Registration with USAID is optional and is not a requirement for IRS tax-exempt status. 
However, it is required to become eligible to apply for grants, contracts, and other 
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 USAID. “PVO Definitions.” 
 http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/private_voluntary_cooperation/new.html 
15USAID. “Conditions of registration for U.S. Organizations.” http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-
cutting_programs/private_voluntary_cooperation/conditions_us_organizations.pdf 
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programs that enable NGOs to receive government funding or participate in 
reimbursement programs. These programs include development grants, cooperative 
development, ocean freight reimbursement, limited excess property, and various global 
health projects.16 Added USAID stipulations apply to FBOs only. Referred to as “the 
Rule,” this legal provision serves a dual purpose to both protect FBOs from 
discrimination on the basis of religious affiliation, and prohibit federal funding of 
explicitly religious activities.17  
 Using annual reports, InterAction membership data, and other sources, McCleary 
coded USAID registered PVOS  into 14 religion classifications: Mainline Protestant, 
Roman Catholic, Orthodox, Faith-Founded Christian, Other Christian, Ecumenical, 
Evangelical, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Interfaith, and other religion (see 
Appendix 2 for definitions) (2009).  
Within the categories of religious affiliation, the FBO sector encompasses a wide 
range of organizations, from those with an explicitly religious mission, to those with only 
a heritage based loosely on religious values. McCleary’s coding methodology, while 
accounting for diversity within beliefs does not account for diversity of religious fervor. 
To detail this diversity in quantitative analysis, organizations were coded into five 
categories to form a ‘religiosity’ scale based on Jeavon’s seven characteristics of 
religious organizations (1998).  Jeavon notes that religious organizations can be defined 
based on seven criteria: self-identity; participants; material resources; definition and 
distribution of power; goals, products, or services; decision-making processes; and 
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 USAD. “PVO Funding Opportunities.” http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-
cutting_programs/private_voluntary_cooperation/funding.html 
17
 USAID . “USAID “Rule” for Participation by Religious Organizations.” 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/global_partnerships/fbci/rule.html 
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organizational fields.  He collected these data by examining the rhetoric of both aid 
delivery and materials aimed at soliciting donations from the public.  
I adapt Jeavon’s seven categories into five criterion:  
1. Presence of a religious person or clergy member in a leadership role of the 
organization, such as president or executive director, or on the board of directors 
(captures decision-making processes);  
2. Quotes of religious text displayed prominently on the organization’s website, 
annual report, or as part of the mission and values (material resources); 
3.  Support of projects with a faith component, including bible distribution, bible 
classes, church planting, religious education, and evangelism (goals, products, or 
services);  
4. Use of religious terms,  names, or a “Statement of Faith” on the organization’s 
website, annual report, or as part of the mission and values (self-identity);  
5. Religious based criteria for employment and/or volunteering, including the 
requirement of a statement of faith, description of religious beliefs, or a reference 
from a religious leader (participants).  
It is important to note that by definition, this scale is most useful to capture the 
diversity existing within Christian FBOs. Non-Christian FBOs do not tend to express 
their religiosity in ways that are captured by this scale. Berger notes this limitation, 
stating that “Christian NGOs, for example, tend to focus their mission on charity and 
emphasize concepts of “God” and “faith”…Jewish organizations, on the other hand, 
make few references to God or religion, focusing instead on the social justice teachings 
of the Torah as the basis for their advocacy oriented missions” (Berger 2003). Due to this 
limitation, I will use the ‘religiosity index’ exclusively for describing Christian FBOs. 
3.2 Hypotheses 
 As discussed in the literature review, the preexisting research is structured in two 
opposing camps: recipient need (‘altruists’) versus donor strategic interests (‘cynics.’) 
While NGO research is in its infancy, initial results suggest that these private groups are 
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unaffected by the less than altruistic motives that plague official aid (Nancy and 
Yontcheva 2006; Koch 2007; Koch et al. 2008; Koch 2009; Buthe et al. 2009). The 
questions of interest in this research will determine to what degree US FBOs are driven 
by strategic interests versus recipient need through an examination of five main 
hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1: Recipient Need. Donors, whether the federal government or  individual 
contributors of a much smaller magnitude, give money under the assumption that FBOs 
choose to serve those most in need. The federal government has justified increased 
delivery of foreign aid through private organizations because of the commonly held 
notion that private groups operate with purer intentions. Many organizations tout this 
attribute in annual reports or on their websites. For example, both Food for the Poor and 
Hermanidad, operate under the tag line: “Serving the poorest of the poor.”  
To what extent is this true? I hypothesize that based on their expressed goals, FBOs 
will be more likely to work in countries with high need. I measure high need by three 
indicators. First, GDP per capita will be used to determine high need in terms of country 
level economic output. This basic indicator of economic prosperity is commonly used 
throughout aid allocation literature.  
GDP per capita captures a country level aggregation of economic health, but masks 
the presence of an unequal distribution of wealth within a country. To mitigate this 
weakness, the Gini coefficient will also be included as a predictor variable, where zero 
corresponds to perfect equality and one hundred corresponds to perfect inequality. This 
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measure of economic inequality will serve as a cross-country comparison of dispersion of 
wealth.  
The third measure captures aspects of quality of life and health. The Human 
Development Index (HDI) is an indicator produced by United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP). HDI encompasses all aspects of quality of life, including life 
expectancy, adult literacy rate, and standard of living. Since GDP per capita is a 
component of HDI (measuring standard of living), I will include an additional quality of 
life indicator to verify that the significance of HDI is not due to GDP per capita.  
Previous research in this field has used a variety of indicators to capture this aspect of 
need, including child mortality rate (Gang and Lehman 1990) and life expectancy 
(Schraeder et al. 1998). However, since HDI is the most widely used and holistic measure 
of recipient need, I will include it in my analysis to compare my results with other 
studies.18  
I hypothesize that FBOs are driven by recipient need. I expect all three indicators, 
GDP per capita, Gini Coefficient, and HDI to be statistically significant. I hypothesize 
GDP per capita and HDI will have a negative coefficient, indicating that organizations 
will be more likely to select to work in the country as need increases. I expect a positive 
coefficient Gini index, indicating that organizations will be more likely to choose to work 
in areas with high economic inequality.  
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 Note that researchers prefer the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) as a measure of recipient need 
because it does not include an economic component and this mitigates the problems of using HDI and GDP 
per capita in the same model estimation. However, PQLI has not been updated since its initial publication 
in 1979 and I did not have the resources to do so myself. 
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The following hypothesis will address various aspects of donor interest. 
Hypothesis 2: Maximizing Success. Faith-based groups, like all NGOs, are constrained 
by their financial budget. To solicit donations from private donors and win grants and 
contracts from the federal government, organizations must demonstrate successful 
results. Organizations must operate strategically to ensure survival. One way of operating 
strategically is to avoid places that are difficult to work in. These projects may take up 
too much time and resources and, if unsuccessful, could harm the organization’s 
reputation. I hypothesize that organizations will be more likely to work in ‘easier’ 
environments in comparison to ‘difficult’ ones in order to maximize program success. I 
define an ‘easy’ environment as a democratic country with low levels of corruption and 
high rule of law.  
For the purposes of this study, measure of difficulty of environment will be twofold. 
Indicators of political freedoms and civil liberties have been commonly used throughout 
development literature to quantify level of democracy. A more democratic society will 
have the capacity and infrastructure to absorb aid. Moreover, these countries will have 
security and rule of law to ensure that tangible goods, such as food aid or physical 
buildings, remain intact and are not destroyed as soon as the aid organization leaves the 
area. Working in safe environments also minimizes the necessary security costs.19  
Practitioners and academics are at odds on the effect of governance on aid. Recent 
academic literature supports that NGOs work in ‘easier’ environments, as measured by 
polity scores (Koch et al 2008), while other research finds such indicators to be 
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 Government 491 Seminar Class, Guest Speaker on Security from InterAction, November 14, 2008. 
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insignificant (Buthe et al 2009, Nancy and Yontcheva 2006). Field research has argued 
that faith-based groups are the most equipped to work in difficult environments and have 
a unique capacity to deliver services to those most in need (Dicklitch and Rice 2004; Van 
de Veen 2002). Policy makers have long supported the view that NGOs can work in the 
dangerous, difficult environments where others will not. In defending USAID’s rational 
for partnering with FBOs, Terri Hasdorff, the former director of the Office of Faith-based 
and Community Initiatives, pointed to FBO’s unique ability to work in hard 
environments, noting that, “in many of the difficult contexts in which we work, FBOs 
have proven to be effective.”20  
Sum of Freedom House scores of civil liberties and political rights, a scale from 2 
(most free) to 14 (least free), will be used to measure country level freedoms (Koch et al 
2008).  I will verify the results using components of the World Bank Good Governance 
indicators (Neumayer 2003). Scores for political stability, government effectiveness, and 
rule of law will be included in the dataset as predictor variables. 
Three additional predictor variables will be included to capture certain factors that 
specifically impact FBOs. Due to the potentially divisive nature of religious groups, 
proselytizing by foreign missionaries is limited throughout the world. Eighty-one 
countries (forty-one percent of the world’s governments) have some sort of legal 
restriction against proselytizing and/or foreign missionaries. Restrictions range from an 
explicit ban on proselytizing by a specific group to quotas and time limitations on visas. 
This data does not include countries which have a total ban on proselytizing and/or 
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 Terri Hasdorff, September 28, 2006. Testimony Subcommittee on Africa, Global Human Rights and 
International Operations, International Relations Committee, U.S. House of Representatives. 
http://www.usaid.gov/press/speeches/2006/ty060928.html 
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foreign missionaries for all groups.21 Eleven countries have a total ban on foreign 
missionaries of any religion.22 Legal restrictions create an obvious limitation to the 
capacity for aid by FBOs.  
In addition to legal restrictions on FBO, some host countries are more hospitable 
than others in terms of level of religious freedom. Two rankings by the Pew Forum on 
Religion and Public life quantify both government and social restrictions on religion. The 
government measure incorporates legal impediments, such as those on foreign mission 
groups (as discussed previously), in addition to government favoritism and hostility 
towards certain (or all) faiths. The social index includes incidents of hostility, terrorism, 
and tension between and within religious groups. Both indices are on a ten point scale, 
with zero being most religiously free and ten being least religiously free. 
Above all, FBOs are accountable to donors. This consideration affects FBOs more 
than their secular counterparts. FBOs depend more on private funding to finance their 
activities in comparison to secular NGOs. Almost 90% of FBO annual revenue in 2005 
was from private sources, in contrast to 75% for secular NGOs. These private sources 
include individual donors, churches, corporations, or grant-makers such as the Gates 
Foundation or Open Society Institute. At the end of each fiscal year, organizations must 
be prepared to show some evidence of measureable success. The most accessible of these 
are visual proof of those they have helped, physical evidence of money well spent. To 
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 This information is based on Pew Research Global Restriction on Religions. These results are similar to 
those of the Religion and State Project, The. Ed. Jonathan Fox.  Bar-Ilan University. 
<http://www.biu.ac.il/soc/po/ras/index.html>. They find that 77 countries, or 41% allow foreign 
missionaries with some restrictions. Note this number does not include countries with explicit bans on 
foreign missions. 
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 Burma(Myanmar), Iran, Kuwait, Libya, Maldives, Mauritania, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, and Indonesia 
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ensure success, FBOs will operate in locations that provide the right atmosphere to 
achieve those results. I hypothesize that FBOs will be less likely to choose to operate in 
politically or religiously restrictive environments.  
Hypothesis 3: Cultural Congruence. Previous literature of official aid supports the 
hypothesis that governments favor recipients with common cultural backgrounds, such as 
former colonial ties. According to Berthelemy and Tichit, “alliances based on historical-
political ties play a major role in the aid allocation policies” of Western governments 
(2004). More often than not, aid is funneled to places where the recipients resemble, or 
share a common past, with the donor.  
Past colonial history will be accounted for in with a dummy variable. Previous 
academic research has included this measure, although more frequently when studying 
European donors. While the US does not have a significant history as a colonizer, 
especially in comparison to European nations, it is important to control for countries with 
strong US involvement. Using Dollar and Levin’s coding, I include Panama, Philippines, 
Haiti, and Nicaragua as US colonies (2006).   
Many studies have investigated shared religious beliefs as a measure of cultural 
congruence. However, no there is no consensus in the literature of the degree of 
significance of common religious beliefs. Some research finds a religion dummy to be 
significant (Nielson et al 2008, Younas 2008, Buthe 2009), while others, such as Allesina 
and Dollar (2000), do not find religion to be significant.  
As seen in previous literature, NGOs and official aid prefer to work in countries with 
common cultural characteristics. Applying this logic to the faith-based sector, I suggest 
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that FBOs will be more likely to select to work in countries with a high percentage of co-
adherents for two reasons. First, FBOs may have a stronger desire to help co-adherents in 
comparison to others. Secondly, FBOs can work through their social networks and 
existing infrastructure when operating abroad in countries with co-adherents. As 
discussed, the ease of transition from purely religious group to non-governmental charity 
is aided by this preexisting network of believers, often found in all corners of the globe. 
FBOs formally affiliated with a religion, such as MCC, the religious arm of the 
Mennonite Church, can work through existing church networks, diocese, or 
administrative units when selecting where to work. Even groups without official ties to an 
established denomination work may choose to locate religious leader and funnel money, 
aid, and projects through them.23 When working in this manner, recipients may be 
identified though religious association. Table 1 shows aid allocations FBOs, NGO sector, 
and ODA. The geographic distribution of country commitments by FBOs closely follows 
that of the distribution of the world’s Christian population. 
Cultural congruence will be measured in two ways. To account for shared religious 
traditions, I turn to measures of religious demography to develop three ‘religion match’ 
variables. I obtained data for religious adherence in 2000 from McCleary and Barro 
(2005). ReligMatch_1 is coded if an organization operates in a country where the 
majority (50% or more) of the people adhere to the same faith. Similarly, ReligMatch_2 
is coded if an organization operates in a country where the plurality of the people adhere 
to the same faith. Both of these variables operate under the assumption that there is some 
threshold, or base percentage, of fellow adherents necessary for an organization to select 
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 Rachel Hess, Mennonite Economic Development Associates, Phone Conversation, February 19, 2010. 
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to work in a certain environment. A third variable, ReligMatch_3, is included without the 
threshold assumption. This variable is the percentage of same adherents, bounded 
between zero (no co-adherents exist in the country) and one (everyone in the country 
adheres to the same faith as the organization). In all cases, I expect a positive coefficient 
with the predictor variables, indicating that as donor and recipient have more in common 
at the country level, the donor is more likely to select to work in that environment. 
Hypothesis 4: Persecuted Minorities. As discussed in the previous hypothesis, I expect 
FBOs to be more likely to select to work with co-adherents abroad. However, due to the 
nature of country level analysis, the within country diversity is lost through aggregation. 
Minority groups, such as the Christian Copts in Egypt, garner significant attention from 
aid groups in the US, especially those organizations run by members of the Diaspora. 
However, at the country level, this minority group only accounts for 0.8% of Egyptians. 
Previous research has also suggested this as an avenue for further investigation (Koch 
2009). 
The Minorities at Risk data for 2004-2006 is used to identify minority groups that 
face restrictions on religion. The database contains information of minority groups, notes 
their religious affiliation, whether it differs from the majority group, and if (and to what 
extent) the group faces religious persecution. The variable, Minority_1, is coded if a 
minority group of the same as the FBO exists in the country of interest. I hypothesize that 
FBOs will be driven to work in countries where their co-adherents are persecuted. I 
expect a positive relationship with the minority predictor variables if FBOs target 
persecuted minorities abroad. 
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Hypothesis 5: Non-Governmental Organization? More and more organizations are not 
only accepting government funding, but also relying on this source of revenue for a 
significant proportion of their funding. Some scholars even go so far to ask if ‘non-
governmental organization’ is even an appropriate term considering so many 
organizations receive a high percentage of funds from the government, addressing the 
issue of “dependency” (Smillie 1997). Considering these facts, a natural extension is to 
question if FBOs are merely “implementers of [back] donor policies” (Nancy and 
Yontcheva 2006). FBOs have become an essential way to deliver US official aid, acting 
as an arm of the state in foreign relations abroad. Previous research has indicated that 
international NGOs prefer to follow the preferences of “back-donors,” as measured by 
ODA aid allocations (Koch et al 2008). Support for this hypothesis is also found in the 
clustering effects that plague foreign aid. Research indicates find that NGOs are more 
likely to work where other NGOs and official aid groups are working (Koch 2009). If the 
US is sending money and workers to a certain area, the clustering theory predicts that 
FBOs will follow suit. 
As discussed, all organizations included in this study’s dataset, whether they receive 
government funding or not, have a relationship with the federal government. By selecting 
to register with USAID as a PVO, these organizations subscribe to government practices 
and align to some degree with US policy. I hypothesize that FBO aid will follow official 
aid. In other words, as the percentage of government funding allotted to a particular 
country increases, the FBO will be more likely to commit to working in the 
environments.  
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To test this hypothesis, official US foreign aid allocations for FY 2005 will be 
included as a predictor variable. In addition, I include dummy variables for Egypt and 
Israel. Previous scholars have noted that due to past US involvement, these two countries 
receive a disproportion amount of aid and favoritism from the United States (Younas 
2008). Berthelemy (2006) notes that “the assistance to Israel come, however, for more 
than 90% from the United States.” For this reason, the I add a “USA-Israel” dummy 
variable. These variables will be used to test if the preference of the US government is 
indeed a preference for FBOs.  
3.3 Data Sources and Methods 
All FBOs registered with USAID as PVOs during FY 2005 were researched for 
inclusion in the cross-sectional dataset.24 All financial information is from the McCleary 
dataset available online (2009), though it is noted that this data is based on financial 
information publically available through USAID.25 All religious affiliation coding is from 
McCleary (2009). McCleary coded organization using online resources, annual reports, 
and personal communication with organizations. Of the 543 US based PVOs registered 
during FY 2005, 179 were identified as faith-based by the McCleary coding scheme. 
These FBOs account for 38.4% of annual revenue of all registered PVOs and 24.4% of 
government funding (FY 2005) (see Appendix 2 for further detail).  
Through this process of researching each organization included in the McCleary 
dataset, 22 were no longer in existence, had suspended international programming, or had 
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 Alternate databases of FBOs were investigated, including the Religion and Global Development 
Database by the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs at Georgetown University and 
InterAction Member Directory. However, I found the PVO dataset to be the most complete.  
25Rachel McCleary, Harvard University. http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/rmcclea/data.html 
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merged with another organization. Essential information for coding country commitments 
was not available. Due to lack of available information, these organizations are not 
included in the dataset for analysis.  
Underlying this research is the assumption that organizations included in the 
dataset can select to work in any country in the world. The predictor variables will be 
used to show what factors, whether attributes of the country or characteristics of the 
organization, make a FBO more likely to work in one country in comparison to another. 
However, several organizations were formed for helping a specific group of people. 
Those organizations with an explicit mission statement violate this assumption of 
geographic selectivity, thus 28 organizations were removed from the dataset for the 
purposes of analysis. These organizations represent 16% of the all registered faith-based 
organizations in FY 2005. Examples of deleted organization include Nicaraguan 
Christian Relief Ministries, Inc. or Coprodeli USA. Each of these organizations was 
committed to helping only one country.  
Insert Table 3 about here 
One hundred twenty nine organizations remain after both the deletion of both 
organizations founded to help specific countries and organizations without information 
available (see Appendix 5). Table 3 lists summary statistics for both the McCleary dataset 
and the dataset of interest. Total annual revenue and federal government annual revenue 
have a similar distribution for both datasets  
The dependent variable is country commitment. Information for the dependent 
variable was obtained from organization annual reports, GuideStar database, and IRS 990 
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forms.26 If an organization was involved in a country during FY 2006, this variable is 
coded as one. All other observations are zeros. I define country commitment as 
organization supports a project, sends volunteers, has a foreign office, or supports a local 
NGO financially in the country. Two sections of the 990 form require a listing of country 
involvements: foreign bank accounts27 or maintenance of an office abroad.28 Additional 
information about country involvement could be gained from schedules of cash and non-
cash grants, usually attached as an addendum to the 990 form. Country commitments 
include both development aid and emergency relief or humanitarian aid. The initial 
coding strategy was to classify these two types of country commitments separately. In 
practice, however, this was not feasible due to the lack of publicly available information.  
While information on country involvements of FBOs was readily available, 
funding disbursements at the country or project level were not. The IRS 990 form 
requires an expense amount for each program.29 However, descriptions of projects were 
not sufficient or disaggregated at the country level for many organizations. Only 13 
organizations included in the dataset provided a country-level breakdown of funding for 
FY 2006, either within the IRS 990 form or through annual reports (See Appendix 7 for 
discussion).30  
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 I gained access to GuideStar information through an unsponsored researcher permit.   
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 Part VI (“Other Information”), questions: 91 a: “At any time during the calendar year, did the 
organization have an in interest in or a signature or other authority over a financial account in a foreign 
country (such as a bank account, securities account, or other financial account)?” 
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 Part VI (“Other Information”), questions  91 b.: “At any time during the calendar year did the 
organization maintain an office outside of the united states?” 
29
 Part III, IRS 990 form, 2006 version “Statement of Program Service Accomplishments” 
30
 American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee, American Leprosy Missions, Floresta, Global Health 
Ministries, Habitat for Humanity, Healing Hands International, Heart to Heart International, Hope 
International, Living Water International, Nazarene Compassion Ministries, Opportunity International, The 
Salvation Army World Service Office, and United Board for Christian Higher Education in Asia. 
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The lack of allocation information is a limitation of this research. Some scholars, 
however, think country commitments are superior to allocation data for quantitative 
research purposes. “Commitments truly describe the allocation process while being 
untainted by the substantial volatility and instability found in aid disbursements” (Nancy 
and Yontcheva 2006). Unlike country commitment, allocation data may vary 
substantially from year to year and reflects “both failure of donors to abide by their 
commitments, administrative hurdles, and lack of recipient cooperation” (Nancy and 
Yontcheva 2006, 7). Berthelemy and Tichet (2004) reiterate this view, noting that, “this 
variable better reflects the donor decisions. Donors have total control of the 
commitments, compared to the disbursements, which depend in part on the recipients’ 
willingness and administrative capacity to get the money” (Berthelemy and Tichit 2004, 
254).  
The dependent variable describes country commitments during 2006. The 
predictor variables, however, are lagged one year and correspond to 2005. Several studies 
rationalize the use of lagged dependent variables. Organizations use the previous year’s 
financial information and country level indicators when making decisions on where to 
work in the next year (Nancy and Yontcheva 2006, Loud et al 2008). 
Total annual revenue is included as indicators of resources available to 
organizations. All financial data is published by USAID in the Volunteer Agency 
(VOLAG) publication, with a two year delay. Since 2005 is the year of interest for this 
study, all financial information can be found in the 2007 VOLAG publication.  Annual 
revenue provides an obvious constraint on the geographic distribution of an organization. 
Those with more money have the financial ability and power to operate in more countries 
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around world. Revenue of FBOs comprises a significant portion of PVO revenue.  In FY 
2005, the 543 PVOs registered with USAID had an annual revenue of $23.6 billion. 
FBOs account for over one-third of the sector revenue (38.4%), with $9.1 billion.  
Similar to the NGO sector in general, a few organizations dominate the industry. 
20 FBOs have total revenue greater that $100 million in FY 2005. This high revenue 
segment of the industry is dominated by predominantly Christian organizations, such as 
World Vision and Catholic Relief Services. In fact, the largest U.S. based international 
aid organization today is World Vision, with over $1 billion in annual revenue. 31 These 
20 organizations account for 74% of the entire FBO sector and 79% of the government 
funding allocated to the FBO industry. Additionally, these organizations are big players 
in the non-profit sector in general. The 20 organizations even make up a substantial 
portion of NGO revenue in general, accounting for 28% of PVO revenue. Due to the 
skewered distribution of revenue, I take the log of total annual revenue. 
One-hundred and fourteen countries are included in the dataset. This study follows in 
the country selection methodology of Younas (2008), Nancy and Yontcheva (2006), and 
Burnside and Dollar (2000) (See Appendix 4). Development Assistance Committee 
(DAC) donor countries are not included in the dataset. Interesting countries, such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq, are also not included for analysis due to lack of reliable 
development indicators. Typical imputation strategies for values such as population or 
GDP are not possible. Therefore, countries with missing indicators are not included in the 
analysis.  
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  Nicholas Kristof. “Learning from the Sins of Sodom.” New York Times, February 27, 2010. 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/opinion/28kristof.html 
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This cross-sectional dataset only describes country commitments during one year. 
Shocks, such as natural disasters, cause an outpouring of aid beyond what is initially 
budgeted. This is of important consideration since coding of the dependent variable 
accounts for organization involvement for both development work and emergency aid 
and relief efforts. Without the natural disaster, the country most likely would not receive 
the attention by the US NGO community or official aid organizations. A dummy variable 
is included to account for 2004 Indonesian Tsunami, 2005 Kashmir Earthquake (coded 
for Pakistan), and 2006 Southern Leyte Mudslides in the Philippines.  
Throughout this analysis, the unit of observation is the organization’s decision to 
operate in a country. Each observation describes the individual decision by each 
organization to work in a specific country. Research discussed in the literature review 
studies the allocation process, which consists of two stages: first the organization select 
or commit to working in country, secondly, they decide how much to allocate to the 
country. The dataset studied in this paper only describes the first stage of this process, 
using a dichotomous, bounded dependent variable. Binary logistic regression is the 
appropriate model to estimate the first selection process. Estimates for the allocation 
model including 15 organizations and can be found in Appendix 7.  
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4. Results 
4.1 Country Selection Stage 
I begin the analysis by investigating the first stage of the aid allocation process, 
selection of recipient countries. As described, the dataset describes the involvement of 
129 organizations in 114 countries. The dyadic nature of the dataset yields 14,706 
observations (country x organization). The dependent variable takes the value of 1 when 
an organization is active in the country during 2006, and zero otherwise. The base model 
includes the predictor variables of GDP per capita (logged), population (logged), disaster 
dummy, and total annual revenue (logged). I employ a logistic regression model to fit the 
data.  Column 1 of Appendix 6 lists the coefficient and p-values for the base model. The 
base model correctly predicts 87.03% of the observations, where a predicted probability 
of .5 or greater corresponds to a predicted dependent variable of 1. The Pseudo R2 value 
of .0991 indicates that the predictor variables account for 10% of the variance. While this 
measure of model fit is low in comparison to typical OLS R2 values, note that Pseudo R2 
values are characteristically low in logistic regression models (Hosmer and Lemeshow 
2000). 
All predictor variables included in the base model are highly significant. As 
hypothesized, GDP per capita has a negative sign. Increasing GDP per capita by 
$1/capita decreases the odds of selecting to work in a country by 22%. The dummy 
variable to control for the presence of a catastrophic natural disaster was also significant. 
The occurrence of a disaster increases the odds of working in a country, regardless of 
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other, factors by 40%. This indicates that FBOs are responsive to unexpected shocks of 
emergency relief and aid.  
The population variable is slightly more difficult to interpret. In previous 
allocation research, this variable typically has a negative coefficient, indicating that larger 
countries receive less aid per capita than smaller countries. In other words, larger 
countries obtain more gross aid, but at a diminishing level (Buthe 2009, Isenman 1976, 
Betherlemy and Tichit 2004). Additionally, ODA research indicates that donors bias aid 
commitments against larger countries (Younas 2008). However, a positive coefficient can 
be explained in the context of a selection model, in comparison to an allocation model. 
As population increases, there are more communities and people to serve as potential 
recipients for faith-based aid. Simply, a larger country with more people has more 
possible to work and people to help.  
Finally, organization revenue is positive and highly significant. This indicates that 
as available funds increases, FBOs are much more likely to select to work in a country. 
The high significance of this variable and its coefficient may be interpreted as 
organizations overall want to increase their global presence as funding increases, rather 
than concentrate their efforts in one country or geographic area. From the base model’s 
results, I conclude that faith-based organizations favor involvement in large, low-income 
countries.  
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The following columns of Appendix 6 show the results of the five hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: Recipient need. Results relating to recipient need can be found in 
columns 2 through 4. In total, recipient need as a motivator of aid is supported for 
economic measures of need. Both the Gini Coefficient and GDP per capita are significant 
variables in describing selection of country level aid recipients. In terms of recipient 
need, the findings indicate that GDP per capita alone is inadequate to explain country 
selection. The coefficient of GDP per capita remains stable and is negative and 
statistically significant as described above in the base model.  
First, I replace GDP per capita with two alternate measures of recipient need, Gini 
coefficient and Human Development Index (HDI). Using the Gini Index as the sole 
measure of recipient need is significant at the 1% level with a positive coefficient. This 
indicates that FBOs are more likely to work in the country as economic inequality 
increases (column 3). HDI is statistically significant as well, with a negative coefficient, 
when replacing GDP per capita as the measure of recipient need (column 2). FBOs are 
more likely to work in a countries with low levels of development. 
Next, the Gini coefficient and HDI are tested jointly with GPD/capita (column 4). 
Both the Gini coefficient and HDI are significant in this model. As when tested alone, the 
Gini coefficient has a positive coefficient, indicating that for each one unit increase in 
economic inequality, the odd of selecting to work in the country increase by 4.8 
percent.32 However, when controlling for GDP per capita, the relationship between HDI 
and the dependent variable reverses. For each 10% increase in HDI, the odds of working 
                                                           
32
 Note that Gini Index is between 0 and 100, where 0 indicates perfect equality and 100 refers to perfect 
inequality 
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in a county increase by 30%.  I suggest that this inconsistency is due to the composition 
of HDI. As stated in the hypothesis section, HDI is composed of three measures: GDP 
per capita, life expectancy, and level of education as measured by school enrollment and 
literacy. When this measure is included as a predictor variable in the regression equation 
in lieu of GDP per capita, it takes a negative relationship, due to the economic 
component. When GDP per capita is controlled for, the relationship reverses, indicating 
that NGOs prefer to work in environments with low levels of economic well being (as 
measured by GDP per capita and Gini coefficient relationship), but high levels of 
development. This result indicates the hypothesis holds for economic indicators of 
recipient need.  
To further investigate the results of hypothesis 1, two additional indicators of 
recipient need are used to verify the robustness of the results. Both gross primary school 
enrollment and life expectancy rates are used in the literature as a measure of recipient 
need (see Berthelemy and Tichit 2004). Unlike HDI, neither of these two indicators 
encompasses an economic measure. Using these two indicators isolates the effect of each 
component of HDI variable. When used jointly with Gini Coefficient and GDP per 
capita(logged) in place of HDI, both life expectancy and  gross primary school 
enrollment are significant at the 1% level with a positive coefficient (column 3a) The sign 
indicates that FBOs are more likely to select to work a country as either life expectancy 
or primary school enrollment increase. This finding runs counter to the hypothesis of 
selecting to work in areas with high recipient need. This finding may indicate FBO’s 
preference to work in areas with high capacity. As development increases, countries may 
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have the infrastructure to use the aid delivered by FBOs, in comparison to countries with 
lower levels of development. 33 
 The significance of both the Gini coefficient and components of HDI jointly with 
GDP per capita indicates that FBOs primarily consider economic measures of recipient 
need. FBOs are responsive to economic measures of recipient need, selecting to work in 
areas with high economic inequality and low GDP per capita. However, the findings for 
the non-economic components of HDI run counter to the claims of FBOs. Broader, 
holistic measures of poverty and development, as measured by primary school enrollment 
and life expectancy do not support the hypothesis.   
Hypothesis 2: Maximizing Success. Results related to ease of working environment can 
be found in columns 5 - 8. First, the sum of Freedom House scores for political rights and 
civil liberties is used as the sole measure of ease of working environment. Use of 
Freedom House data reveals that a one point decline of either political rights or civil 
liberties results in a 7% decrease in the odds of selecting to work in a country. There are 
several implications to this finding. Increases in civil unrest, corruption, or violence deter 
FBOs. Instead, FBOs prefer to work in more politically free environments, as captured by 
the Freedom House methodology.  
Next, measures of both government and social restrictions of religion were tested 
individually (columns 6-7). The results indicate significance at the 1% level. As shown 
by the negative relationship, FBOs are less likely to work in environments as restrictions 
on religious freedom increase. A one point decrease in either government or social 
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 Note that almost 35% of observations are missing for the primary school enrollment variable (N=9417). 
For this reason, life expectancy will be used in further model specification and testing. 
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measures of religious freedom decreases the odds of selecting to work in a country by 
15% and 5%, respectively. Significance of the religious freedom predictor variables 
indicates that FBOs may take additional variables into account when selecting where to 
work in comparison to their secular counterparts.  
Measures of religious freedom were tested jointly with measures of political 
rights and civil liberties (column 8). An additional dummy variable to control for a ban 
on foreign missionary groups is also included. Coefficients for Freedom House and the 
social measure of religious freedom variable are statistically insignificant.34 In contrast, 
the two measures of government restriction on religion are significant at the 5%  level, 
indicating that governmental measures on religious freedom are better predictors of FBO 
country selection than political measures. A ban on foreign missionaries by the host 
government decreases the odds of selecting to work in a country by almost 40%. The 
coefficient on government restriction of religious freedom remains consistent as when 
tested individually. This finding supports that not only that faith-based groups primarily 
operate in environments that are hospitable to their religious message or evangelism 
efforts, but these factors trump those of political rights, civil liberties, and good 
governance. FBOs can work most efficiently and optimize their resources in these 
environments. Alternatively, this finding may indicate that FBOs reward positive changes 
in political rights, civil liberties, or religious freedom with more aid. Additional data 
encompassing multiple years is needed to investigate this possible explanation. 
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 Three alternate World Bank Good Governance indicators were included in place of the Freedom House 
variable as a robustness check of measures of the ease of the environment. Only Rule of Law is statistically 
significant when used in place of Freedom House variable, with negative coefficient of -.207, p-value=0.00 
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The results for the total organization revenue predictor variable also give insight 
into the hypothesis on working environment. The total annual revenue (logged) predictor 
variable is highly positive and significant throughout the hypothesis testing. Spreading 
revenue throughout various projects helps an organization cover their bases in some 
respects. If a certain project fails, the organization has numerous other activities and 
commitments in other geographic areas to demonstrate success. Wide geographic 
dispersion of country commitments is one way the organizations maximize success and 
demonstrate good use of donor funding. 
Hypothesis 3: Cultural Congruency. The results for cultural congruence are shown in 
columns 9-13. First, the best measure of shared religious tradition was determined. The 
three religion match variables (majority coding dummy, plurality coding dummy, or 
interval measure) were tested using logistic regression. ReligMatch_3, the percentage of 
shared religious adherents in the recipient country, yielded the best model (column 11). 
While all three measures of shared religious tradition were significant and positive, 
ReligMatch_3 was most significant in hypothesis testing, maximized pseudo R2 value, 
and minimized the Schwarz information criterion (BIC). 
ReligMatch_3 has a positive coefficient in the model. As the proportion of same 
adherents increases by 10% of the population, the odds of working in a country increases 
by 17%. Additionally, the odds of an organization working in a country with a religiously 
homogenous population of same adherents is almost 400% more likely to in comparison 
to a country with no persons practicing the same faith. This finding supports the 
hypothesis that FBOs prefer to work in environments with shared cultural values and 
religious traditions. However, it should be noted that there is no threshold required to 
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operate in a country. For example, 45% of all country commitments by Christian 
organizations are in countries with less than 10% Christians. Shared religious tradition 
increases likelihood of country selection, but not a requirement for involvement.  
In addition to the impact of the religious tradition of the recipient country, past 
colonial history was also controlled for. Like the religious measure of cultural 
congruence, the dummy variable for past colonial history is positive and highly 
significant. The odds of a FBO working in a country with past US involvement in 
contrast to a country is 274% more likely in comparison to a country without past 
colonial history (column 12). The sign and statistical significance of the colony dummy 
and religious match variable remain stable when tested jointly (column 13). With the 
inclusion of the colonial dummy, the disaster dummy variable becomes insignificant. 
This result suggests that cultural congruence trumps catastrophic shocks, at least for the 
year of interest of this study. However, a more rigorous analysis is needed to determine if 
disaster aid is truly ‘agnostic’ to cultural affinity while development, and long-term, aid 
is indeed not.  
Hypothesis 4: Persecuted Minorities. The results for persecuted minorities is shown in 
column 14. The academic measure of religiously persecuted minorities was tested using 
data from the Minorities at Risk Project at the University of Maryland. This dummy 
variable measure of minority was found to be significant and had a positive coefficient in 
the regression equation, indicating that organizations would be more likely to work in a 
country a persecuted minority group that shared their faith affiliation (column 14). 
Alternate measures of minority persecution and additional data at the project level are 
needed to verify this result. Additional data at the project level is necessary to identify the 
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religious demographics of the recipients and investigate this hypothesis further. 
Formulating a model to capture the correct factors to describe an organization working 
with a minority, persecuted group within a country is very complicated to model. The 
country level model here is not adequate. Additional information at the project level is 
necessary to identify specific aid recipients.  
Hypothesis 5: Non Governmental Organizations? Results for the role of US 
preferences in foreign aid can be found in columns 15-18. To test if US based FBOs are 
influenced by US official aid disbursements during the previous year, I include US 
foreign aid allocations for FY 2005 as an explanatory variable in the model. As 
hypothesized, there is a statistically significant, positive relationship with this variable. 
For each increase of $100 million in official funding, the odds an FBO selects to work in 
the country increase by almost 15%. Note that the OECD dataset used as the source for 
US official development aid does not contain information for US aid to Israel. Since this 
data value is essential examining this hypothesis, another source of information was used 
to impute the value. A Congressional Research Service on US aid to Israel was used to 
determine the amount of economic aid delivered to Israel during FY 2005:  $357 million 
(CRS 2009).  
 Two additional dummy variables for Israel and Egypt were also included to 
account for US biases. However, the results indicate that this these preferences do not 
apply to FBOS. When controlling for other explanatory variables, FBOs do not prefer to 
work in Egypt. The dummy variable is has a negative sign and is statistically significant 
at the 1% level. The dummy variable for Israel is statistically insignificant when tested as 
possible explanatory parameters in the model. This finding indicates that while FBOs are 
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more likely to become involved in countries receiving US aid, they do not exhibit the 
same bias towards Egypt and Israel, in comparison to as official aid. 
4.2 Selected Model.  
I select the best model using stepwise regression (both forward and backward). 
Measures to compare models, including pseudo R2 and information criteria indicate this 
is the preferred model. As the results indicate, there is no single indicator that can 
accurately model the country level recipients of aid from FBOs. The full model 
incorporates a combination of recipient need, cultural congruency, measures of religious 
freedom, and official aid allocation, which are all statistically significant at the 5% level 
(column 19).35  Note that the variables for GDP per capita (logged), population (logged), 
revenue (logged) remain robust throughout various model specifications and the 
coefficients remain stable and highly significant. Shared religious tradition is a significant 
motivator in country selection, similar to previous research by Koch et al. (2008) and 
Buthe et al. (2009). Similar to previous studies, I verify that FBOs prefer to work in freer 
environments, in respect to governmental restrictions on religious freedom. This finding 
is similar to the preferences of NGOs to work in democratic countries (Koch et al 2008) 
with low levels of militarization (Nancy and Yontcheva 2006). I verify the evidence of 
Koch et al that the allocation of foreign aid by the FBO host country is a significant 
motivator. This finding is in contrast to Nancy and Yontcheva (2006). In terms of 
comparing the FBO sector to NGOs in general, I find evidence to support that faith based 
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 Note that I repeat the hypothesis testing for the observations in the full model (N=10578) to verify 
missing observations are not driving the findings. I obtain similar results 
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groups are motivated by similar factors. Moreover, this finding holds when considering 
an expanded sample that includes both newer and smaller revenue organizations. 
4.3 Post Estimation Diagnostics.  
Two methodological issues created problems when modeling the data: inflated N 
value and over-dispersion of the dependent variable. The unit of analysis for this research 
is the organization’s decision to operate in a country. Each organization must make 114 
decisions, to select to work (or not work) in any number of countries. The dataset thus 
consists 14,706 of dyadic organization-country observations. The implication of inflation 
of sample size is spurious inferences and thus an increase in the probability of Type I 
error (rejecting the null hypothesis when it is true). Other studies have also suffered from 
inflated observations. For example, several studies analyze three-dimensional panel 
datasets (year x donor x recipient). Berthelemy uses a dataset consisting of almost 60,000 
observations (2006).  
Additionally, the dependent variable is zero-inflated. Over dispersion of the 
dependent variable has not been a methodological issue for ODA research. For the US 
official aid allocation, 90% of countries receive some degree of foreign aid. However, 
this is an issue for modeling private aid commitments. The mean number of country 
commitments per organization in this dataset is 14.73.These organizations operate with 
comparatively fewer resources and more constraints, which results in increased country 
selectivity (Dollar and Allesina 2000, 42). In this dataset, more than 80% of the 
dependent variable are zeros.   
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To verify my findings, I sample from my dataset. I randomly select 50% of 
observations where the dependent variable takes the value of one. I do the same for 
observations were the dependent variable equals zero. I append these two subsets, 
forming a new dataset and repeat analysis for the full model. I repeat this sampling 
procedure 100 times. The mean pseudo R2 value is .1166, with 5371 mean number of 
observations. The significance for dummy variables for Egypt, persecuted minorities, and 
Freedom House are inconsistent throughout this testing. The coefficients and significance 
levels for the other variables included in the full model (column 19) remain stable.  
Regression diagnostics indicate that the full model is not sufficient as a predictor 
of where FBOs select to work.  Several assumptions are made when performing logistic 
regression, including that the true conditional probabilities are a logistic function of the 
independent variables, no important variables are omitted (specification error), no 
extraneous variables are included, absence of measurement error, and the inclusion of 
independent observations and linearly independent explanatory variables (Long 1997).  
To check assumptions, I test for the presence of specification error using a link 
test for single-equation models. The test adds both the predicted value and the predicted 
value squared to the model. For a model with no omitted variables, the predicted value 
will be significant, but the predicted value squared will be statistically insignificant. For 
the full model, the linktest output shows significant value for predicted value squared, so 
I fail reject the hypothesis that I have omitted variables. A necessary predictor variable 
has not been included in the full model, violating the assumptions. The Hosmer and 
Lemeshow test was also performed to assess the goodness of fit of this model. The null 
hypothesis for this test is that the model is a good fit. For the full model (p-value= 
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0.0525), I reject the null hypothesis that the model is a good fit at the 90% confidence 
level.  
Additional tests for multicollinearity indicate problems with both GDP per 
capita(logged) and HDI. The variation inflation factor (VIF) for these variables is 7.28 
and 7.65, respectively. If the predictor variables are orthogonal to one another, or 
uncorrelated, then VIF=1. High values demonstrate that these variables may be 
correlated. This result is not surprising. As discussed previously, GDP per capita is a 
component of the Human Development Index. To address this issue, a life expectancy, a 
non-economic components of HDI is included in place of the complete HDI indicator 
(column 20). Replacing HDI with life expectancy results in VIF values of 2.99 and less 
for all predictor variables, indicating no serious problems with multicollinearity. The 
Hosmer and Lemeshow was test performed again on the new model. The findings 
indicate that this model is a better fit than the previous specification. Replacing HDI with 
life expectancy results in p-value = 0.0967. I fail to reject the null hypothesis that the 
model is a good fit at the 95% confidence level.  However, addressing the collinearity 
issues does not solve the problem of missing predictor variables, as the test for 
specification error is still significant. An examination of the residuals plotted versus the 
fitted values indicates that they are not white noise. 
Based on the regression diagnostics this is not the appropriate specification to 
model FBO behavior and cannot be used to predict where organizations will select to 
work. However, the results are useful to compare the influence of certain predictor 
variables and their effect on the FBO decision making process. 
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 Throughout the analysis, I have made one large assumption in this cross-sectional 
model: FBOs have identical motivations. In the context of this research, I assume that 
each organization is identical and acts in a similar manner when selecting what countries 
to work in around the globe. Under this assumption, I am able to perform the above 
cross-sectional analysis with the expectation that all units of analysis are the same. 
However, there is much evidence that my analytical approach is omitting the diversity 
that exists within the faith-based sector (see Berthelemy 2006 for discussion). If this 
assumption is incorrect, this cross-sectional analysis may suffer from unobserved 
heterogeneity. To test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity, additional, time 
series data is needed to form a panel dataset. However, this information is not available. 
To mitigate the issues modeling issues of this cross-sectional model, I perform a within 
sector analysis and investigate the degree to which FBOs have homogenous aid 
commitments at the country level. In the next sections, I will discuss possible, qualitative 
factors and variables that are also influential in the decision making process of FBOs. 
4.4 Within-Sector Analysis 
This section of analysis will be performed in two parts. First, I will investigate 
variation in country commitments by several organizational characteristics, including 
revenue, percentage of government funding, rhetoric, and affiliation. Based on these 
findings, I devise criteria for examining FBOs in the following implications section  
Total Annual Revenue and Age. As discussed in the literature review, diversity based 
on revenue of organizations is ignored in previous research. Studies in this field 
investigate larger, established organizations, making the assumption that smaller 
organizations follow suit and have similar motivations and organizational characteristics 
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that result in making decisions in an identical manner. The FBO industry, like the private 
aid sector in general, is dominated by a handful of organizations, but smaller groups do 
comprise a significant portion of the sector in terms of revenue. If a similar argument had 
been used for this research, 158 organizations, almost 90% of the dataset, would be 
excluded from analysis by definition (using a cutoff point of $100 million). The ‘smaller’ 
organizations command roughly a quarter of the sector, accounting for $2.3 bill in annual 
revenue and over $200 million in government funding. In terms of country commitments, 
the ‘smaller’ organizations have 1,424, or 75%, of country commitments. Individually, 
these smaller organizations are insignificant. However, as an aggregated block, they 
command too many resources to be ignored from analysis.  
Eliminating smaller organizations in terms of total revenue from the sample also 
biases the sample towards older organizations. Age and total annual revenue (logged) are 
positively correlated (ρ = 0.36, statistically significant at the 99% confidence level), 
indicating that the older the organization, the higher the annual revenue. Older, higher 
revenue organizations may act differently from smaller, newer organizations. First, older 
organizations have had time to develop a reputation. In order to maintain their reputation 
and sustain funding from individuals, private donors, and federal sources, these 
organizations may be more likely to make safer choices.  These ‘safer’ choices may 
include working in ‘easier’ environments and partnering with other organizations in order 
to diffuse blame in the case of failure. They may be more likely to select to operate in 
countries with low levels of political violence and with the political capital to use the aid 
delivered. Operating in this manner maximizes the probability of project success (see 
Kreps, 1990 for discussion). 
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Secondly, many older organizations have been involved in some countries or 
regions for many years. The historical roots of an organization and its initial endeavors in 
many cases still influence where an organization works today. Bebbington describes the 
role of Catholic FBOs working in Latin America (2004). In his research, he profiles 
Cordaid, which began working in Latin America through missionaries work. The 
geographical distribution of the organization today can be explained by the Cordaid’s 
past projects. Thus, partnerships that began in the infancy of an organization still 
influence the relationships and projects an organization supports today (Bebbington 
2004).  
In contrast, new, start-up organizations must find a way to attract donors. One 
way to do this is to take risks and operate programs in dangerous locations. Taking on 
programs in dangerous and volatile areas not only garners attention, but also the 
achievement of success in difficult environments may open up new funding 
opportunities, partnerships with established organizations, or federal government grants 
and contracts. For example, World Help, a young, evangelical organization, heavily 
publicizes their programs in Iraq and North Korea, displaying the information 
prominently on their website and featuring testimonials in annual reports.36 By using this 
type of rhetoric, an organization implicitly claims superiority over other organizations 
that may operate in more developed or stable environments.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
                                                           
36World Help was founded in 1991 and has total annual revenue of $22 million (FY 2007). 
https://www.denarionline.com/DONORSERVICES/TEMPLATEPAGE.ASPX?COMP_REF=_WORLDH
ELP&CONTENT=GIVINGOPTION&DS_GO_REF=_2EX0Z2UBZ 
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When it comes to making decision on where to work, do these smaller, newer 
organizations behave like their older, richer counterparts? There are several findings on 
the effect of age and revenue on country selection. When examining the relationship 
between age and the region of country commitments, I find that older groups most active 
in Europe (Table 4).  Older organizations are slightly more likely to work in Europe, in 
comparison to newer organizations. This finding may be explained by history. 
Historically, many older, US based FBOs were founded in the wake of WWII for the 
explicit purpose of aiding victims of the war (McCleary 2009; Ferris 2005, 314). In this 
way, the increased number of country commitments may reflect the organization’s initial 
purpose. The lack of statistical significance of the result may be attributed to the country 
sample. ‘Risky’ or ‘hard’ countries, such as North Korea, Iraq, or Afghanistan are not 
included in the sample.  
Insert Table 5 about here 
Older FBOs are also involved in more ‘high’ developed areas (Table 5). There is 
a 7% effect of age on country commitments in highly or very highly developed regions. 
As described earlier, older organizations are more established and have a reputation to 
preserve. Working in highly developed regions is an ‘easier’ environment. Highly 
developed areas not only have infrastructure in place to make the logistics of delivering 
aid easier, but also these regions may be more responsive to aid. An alternate explanation 
of this finding may be that the presence of development aid over time has caused an 
improvement in development status. However, this research is not designed to evaluate 
the effectiveness of aid.  
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Government Funding  
“Federal rules will envelop these organizations. They’ll begin to be nurtured, if I can use that term, 
on federal money, and then they can’t get off of it. It’ll be like a narcotic. They can’t then free 
themselves later on.”37  
- Pat Robertson, Operation Blessing International 
As discussed, the size of the organization, in terms of annual revenue, is an 
important consideration when investigating country commitments. A natural extension of 
this question is to examine the origin, either public or private, of these funds. The use of 
federal funding incurs additional regulations and stipulations on how those funds may be 
spent. Often, organizations are allotted funding for specific projects or programs. In 
comparison, private funding is flexible. Organizations may use undesignated funding in a 
discretionary manner.  The proportion of public to private funds, or structured to 
undesignated funding, may impact the way that an organization acts. Organizations that 
do not receive federal funds may have more freedom to choose the projects, programs, 
and locations that best suit their organization, while federally funded organizations may 
be at the will of USAID preferences. Alternatively, an FBO funded primarily by a private 
religious group may be forced to fund projects that reflect donor wishes. Strings attached 
to funds, such as designating funds to a particular cause may tie an organization’s hands 
and limit geographic choice in project selection.  
Government funding divides the faith-based sector roughly in half. Fifty percent 
of the FBOs included in this analysis (65 of 129) do not receive any form of federal 
government funding, either in the form of grants, contracts, or programming discounts. 
All organizations included in the dataset have met the basic qualifications to apply for 
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government funding through the PVO registry process. Why, then, do 50% choose not 
to?  
Several factors influence an organization’s decision to apply for federal funding. 
First, FBOs must have resources, in the form of staff, funding, and time to apply for 
federal funding. In a personal interview with the executive vice president of a Christian 
FBO with annual revenue of $38 million (FY2007), this factor was aptly described as, 
“it’s expensive to get money.”38 In this manner, organization revenue may act a limiting 
or exclusionary factor. Organizations must reach a threshold of minimum revenue and 
resources to apply for government grants and funding. The interviewee noted that his 
organization is interested in several projects funded by the USAID. He argued, however, 
that his organization could not compete with the larger aid organizations that have 
professional grant writers on staff. Additionally, another development practitioner noted 
that many of the larger organizations with existing contracts are asked or invited to apply 
for a specific grant or project.39 Even USAID recognizes this limitation, noting that, “we 
were doing much larger grants and it made it very difficult for small organizations to 
enter into a relationship with us.”40  
Secondly, there is not much overlap between the mission and values of many 
organizations and the projects supported by USAID. According to one development 
professional, USAID supports “sexy” projects, concentrating mostly on the development 
priorities de jure in high profile areas, such as HIV/AIDS programming.41 He noted that 
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there was little in common of between the project supported by the federal government 
and those supported by his organization. Additionally, US foreign aid tends to be 
concentrated in certain geographic areas. As seen in Table 1 from the introduction, FBOs 
have a broader regional distribution and concentrate more of their efforts in the Americas 
in comparison to US official foreign aid.  
Third, by accepting federal funding, an organization must consent to restrictions on 
evangelism and other religious practices. As discussed previously, USAID prohibits the 
federal funding of “inherently” religious activities. Activities, such as proselytization, 
bible worship, and church services, must be separated by “time or location” from USAID 
funded activities.42 Through accepting federal funding, faith-based organizations agree to 
play by the rules stipulated by USAID. For organizations with overtly religious mission 
and values or with projects that include bible distribution, church planting, and religious 
education, these rules are impossible to follow. Moreover, some development workers 
and missionaries view spreading the faith as an essential tenet of their faith, and their 
inherent right. According a personal interview with a development official at an 
evangelical organization, the limits by federal funding translate directly into limits on the 
ability to spread their faith. 43 However, note that there is no difference in the religiosity 
of government funded organizations in comparison to those that do not receive 
government funding. The average index value for government funded Christian groups is 
2.09, in comparison to non-government funded, 2.16 (p-value=.791). 
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Other organizations reject federal funding on a non-religious basis. In a personal 
interview, two development officials at a Christian FBO both cited the waste of federal 
funding as their organization’s reason for not applying for USAID funding. A 
development practitioner at Christian Relief Services cited a statistic that 80% of all 
USAID money stays inside the US, through means such as shipping discounts, 
packaging, farm discounts, and credits. On this ground alone, she did not want her 
organization to be associated with the “politics behind it [federal funding].”44  
Overall, organizations that receive government funding are more involved in 
international development. Of the 129 organizations included in my dataset, 62% of the 
country commitments are supported by organizations that receive some measure of 
government funding.  Next, I go on to examine the effect of dependency on government 
funding on both the region and development status of recipient countries. What effect 
does this distinction have on where organizations select where to work? Are 
organizations with higher levels of government funding more likely to follow official aid 
and federal government priorities in comparison to private FBOs? Or do all organizations 
follow similar patterns? 
Insert Table 6 about here 
As the percentage of total annual revenue originating from federal sources 
increases, country commitments to Africa also increase. Organizations with a high degree 
(more than 20%) of government funding are more likely to work in Africa than other 
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government funded organizations (Table 6). FBOs with a high degree of government 
funding may reflect the US foreign aid budget and the foreign policy priorities of the US.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
Increased attention towards Africa for recipients of government funding may be 
due to US foreign aid priorities. Africa contains the two top recipients of US foreign aid 
allocations in 2005, Sudan and Ethiopia. Table 7 shows the number of aid commitments 
for the top recipients of US foreign aid by whether the FBO received federal funding 
during FY 2005. The majority of aid commitments in both countries are by federally 
funded FBOs. Note however that these results are not statistically significant (p-
value=.294).  
An additional explanation for the higher amounts of country commitments in 
Africa for government funded organizations may be official government aid programs.45 
The President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) committed $15 billion 
dollars in health related aid projects during the year of focus of this study. The 12 of the 
15 “focus countries” are included in the sample and in the Africa region.46 Religious 
groups garnered a significant amount, close to 25%, of contracts to distribute the aid and 
run HIV/AIDS programs in the target countries.47 The faith-based winners of the largest 
contracts include Samaritan’s Purse, HOPE Worldwide, World Relief, World Vision, and 
Catholic Relief Services, which are all included in the dataset. These organizations are all 
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government funded. This surge of funding, which occurred over the year of interest in the 
study, may explain the increase of project commitments to Africa. This table indicates 
that there may be a threshold present (greater than 20% government funded) to be a 
viable candidate for these projects. 48 
Increased attention in Africa may be attributed to both official US foreign aid 
allocation and US foreign relations. As seen in the regression analysis, the variable for 
US aid allocations during 2005 was a significant predictor variable. This finding suggests 
that the greater the degree of dependency on the government for funding, the less “non-
governmental” the organization becomes and the more the organization reflects the 
priorities of the state. These results suggest that hypothesis 5 is particularly supported for 
organizations that receive a high degree of government funding.  
Insert Tables 8 and 9 about here 
Federal government priorities provide opportunities for funding and projects in 
areas of interest to the state. It has been shown in the selection model that federal 
government funding is an important factor to consider and a significant variable to 
consider. However, there is no statistical difference between USAID funded groups and 
private groups, in terms of region or development ranking. Tables 8 and 9 display the 
number of country commitments by organizations that receive federal funds in 
comparison to their entirely private counterparts. The chi-squared test confirms the lack 
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of any statistical difference between the two groups in terms of their geographic presence, 
with p-values 0.981 for by development and 0.743 for region of operation, respectively.49   
This finding may be due to the presence of subcontracting within the FBO 
industry. Subcontracting, or sub-partnering, is prevalent throughout the aid industry 
(Richmond 2005). While an organization may receive federal funds directly, they may be 
partners or contractors on a project that is government funded. For example, Five Talents 
does not receive government funding. However, the organization partners with two 
government funded organizations, World Relief and World Concern to run their micro-
credit program in Southern Sudan. Five Talents is not the primary recipient of USAID 
funding, however the organization may benefit as a secondhand recipient of federal 
funds.50 
My findings do not allow me to reject the term “non-governmental” organization 
when describing FBOs (Smillie1997). I also repeat the regression analysis twice for 
hypothesis 5, once for the sample of organizations which receive government funding 
(N=7,752), and again for those organizations that do receive federal funding (N=6,954). I 
find similar results for both samples. Regardless of whether an organization receives 
USAID funding or not, I find the variable for official US foreign aid allocation to be 
significant at the 5% level.  
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US foreign aid allocation is a necessary predictor variable when modeling the 
geographic selection of US based FBOs. However, there is no difference in the 
geographic preferences by region or development status for organizations that are funded 
by USAID or other federal government programs and those that are not. A similar 
statement can be made for the role of private aid. Organizations that are fully funded by 
private entities, whether it be individuals, corporations, or churches, act in a similar 
manner to those that depend on federal sources for revenue. From this finding, I infer that 
the amount of ‘flexible’ funding has no impact on the geographic distribution of country 
commitments. 
One caveat of this finding is sample bias. All organization included in the analysis 
have registered with USAID and in some respects, submitted to the authority of the state. 
Through the PVO registration process, these organizations may be more likely to follow 
US government funding and foreign policy, regardless of whether they are the recipients 
of USAID money or not. A more complete sample of faith-based organizations is needed 
to ensure that this finding does not apply exclusively to FBOs that register as PVOs with 
USAID.  
Rhetoric. A common phrase used by NGOs in the development industry is to stress their 
commitment to helping not just the poor, but the “poorest of the poor.” To determine if 
there is any difference between organizations who advertise their commitment to the poor 
in comparison to those that do not, I coded a variable ‘Poorest.’ This dummy variable 
takes the value of one if an organization includes the phrase “poorest of the poor” or 
similar variant on their website, in mission and values, or in the organization’s annual 
report for 2005 or 2006. Table 10 shows the results. I find no statistical difference (p-
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value= 0.956) between organizations that advertise their commitment to the ‘poorest of 
the poor’ in comparison to all other FBOs in terms of country commitments by 
development ranking.  
Insert Table 10 about here 
Religious Affiliation. Lastly, I examine the faith-based sector by religious tradition. 
Other studies have found that donors from different countries act different. Do does this 
finding translate to the FBO sector? Do different faith traditions select to work in 
different corners of the globe? Are factors are important to various Christian faiths also 
important to non-Christian FBOs? 
One of the defining features of the FBO sector is past roots in missionary activity. 
Overtime, the mission and values of many of these organizations have expanded to 
encompass public projects aimed at helping those in need, regardless of faith affiliation. 
However, these historic roots, along with social justice teachings, continue to impact 
today’s geographic choices. For this section of the analysis, I describe both the historical 
factors, as well as social justice teachings at play in the various faith traditions of NGOs 
in my dataset. I then repeat the regression analysis by faith tradition, as well as discuss 
the types of projects supported by these organizations. 
Non-Christian FBOs.  
Non-Christian FBOs command a minimal proportion of the aid sector. For 
comparative purposes, I will examine the two largest players, Islamic and Jewish 
charities.  
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Insert Table 11 about here 
Islamic FBOs. Three Islamic organizations included in the analysis: Focus Humanitarian 
Assistance U.S.A. (the development arm of the Aga Khan Foundation), Life for Relief 
and Development, and Mercy-USA for Aid and Development, Inc. In terms of social 
justice teachings, charitable giving is one of the five pillars of Islam. It is a personal 
responsibility of Muslims to contribute a portion of income or wealth for those less 
fortunate. Almsgiving takes two forms, zakat and sadaqa . Zakat is collected from 
Muslims and can only be dispersed for Muslim beneficiaries, while sadaqa, the voluntary 
gift of alms, can be disbursed for anyone in need (Benthall and Jerome Bellion-Jourdan 
2003, 83). Based on this restriction, I expect the religious demography match variable to 
be highly significant in the regression analysis.  
See Table 15 for the results of the logistic regression model for the three Islamic 
organizations. As expected, religious demography variables are highly significant, with 
positive coefficients. In addition, the disaster dummy is highly significant, reflecting the 
fact that the large disasters happened to occur in Islamic countries (Indonesia and 
Pakistan). Both the social and governmental measures of religious freedom are 
significant, indicating Islamic FBOs work in less religiously free societies. In terms of 
ranking, eight of the top ten religiously restrictive countries are Muslim majority (Pew 
Forum 2009). In contrast to the aggregate selection model, traditional measures of 
recipient need, such as GDP per capita, and the Human Development Index are not 
significant, while the Gini coefficient is weakly significant at the 10% level. Shared 
religious tradition trumps all other measures predictor variables when modeling country 
commitments by Islamic organizations.  
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Table 11 shows the country commitments of Islamic organizations in comparison 
to all other FBOs in the dataset. Fifty percent of country commitments are to Asian 
countries, with the remaining assistance split between MENA and Africa. Country 
commitments by Islamic aid agencies are to Kenya, Jordan, Indonesia, Pakistan, West 
Bank and Gaza, Bangladesh, Sierra Leone, India, Indonesia, Syria, Tajikistan, Somalia, 
Pakistan, and Lebanon. Note that only Kenya and India are not a Muslim majority or 
plurality country. Both, however, have a substantial Muslim population consisting of 7% 
of Kenya’s population and 12% of India’s population as of 2000, respectively. Based on 
these results, it is clear that religious demography is the main motivating factor for 
Islamic Charities, trumping recipient need, the priorities of the US government, and 
political situation.  
Jewish FBOS. Jewish FBOs were founded following WWII with the initial mission of 
serving the Jewish population within the United States (McCleary 2009). These 
organizations have expanded their service to international development project outside 
the US border. The dataset contains three Jewish organizations: American Jewish World 
Service, The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Inc., and American ORT, 
Inc. These three organizations are guided by the principle of Tikkun olam, or “repairing 
the world,” Jewish organizations provide support for Jewish populations around the globe 
as well as non-sectarian development and relief work.51 
The selection model for Jewish organizations is a poor fit (see Table 15). The 
variables used in the aggregate model are statistically insignificant predictors, with the 
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exception of population and total revenue (with an unexpected negative sign), for the 
geographic selections of Jewish affiliated organizations. Various measures of recipient 
need and political situation are significant when tested individually, but fail to be 
statistically significant when tested jointly. The religmatch_3 variable is weakly 
significant  the 10% level.  
Table 11 shows the country commitments of Jewish organizations in comparison to 
all other FBOs in the dataset. Almost one-third of country commitments are to Africa, 
which is comparable to the other faith traditions. However, in comparison to the other 
faith affiliated organizations, Jewish groups are more active in both the Americas and 
Europe. The historical roots of these organizations may explain this. In the aftermath of 
the Holocaust, much of these organizations’ resources have been funneled to survivor 
populations, either to Europe or to locations where large Jewish populations settled, such 
as Latin America. Fifteen percent of country commitments are to the European countries, 
the largest percentage of any FBO. The high amount of European commitments are to 
help foster Jewish education, reduce anti-Semitism, and foster development projects for 
the Jewish populations, primarily in Eastern Europe.52 In Latin America, Jewish 
organizations direct their efforts towards Argentina, Chile, and Brazil, which have Jewish 
populations ranging from 1.2% to .2%, respectively.53  
In comparison to Islamic charities, Jewish groups work in areas without a substantial 
Jewish population. Of the 65 country commitments, 40, or 62%, are to countries with no 
Jewish population Jewish population. By no Jewish population, I am referring to 0% in 
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the McCleary and Barro dataset on religious adherence (2005). This dataset reports 
religious demography up to the hundredth of a percentage point. Therefore, pockets of 
minority groups may exist, but not a significant amount to make up a tenth of a 
percentage point. Note that six Jewish organizations were deleted from the dataset during 
the data cleaning stage. These organization work exclusively in Israel. The inclusion of 
these organizations would result in 16% of country commitments to countries in the 
Middle East and North Africa.  
Christian FBOs 
Insert Tables 12 and 13 about here 
Christian FBOs make up the bulk of the dataset FBO sector. How do Christian FBOs 
differ from non-Christian FBOs? How do we explain the diversity that occurs within the 
Christian category? First, I analyze the organization rhetoric of Christian FBOs through. 
As discussed earlier, five categories of ‘religiosity’ were coded from publically available 
sources, including organization websites, financial statements, and annual reports. The 
five indices include Board of Directors consisting of one or more religious person, use of 
religious text, evangelism and/or bible distribution, use of religious terms, and religious 
requirements for hiring. Tables 12 and 13 show the effect of religious index on 
development ranking of recipient country and region of recipient country. Both tables 
indicate fairly consistent geographic distribution by region and development level at the 
various index values. For regional geographic distribution, Christian FBOs tend to focus 
their efforts roughly equally between the Americas, Africa and Asia, regardless of 
religiosity index ranking. Only a minimal proportion, no more than 17% for any index 
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level, go to Europe and MENA. This is in direct contrast  to Islamic and Jewish FBOs, 
who concentrate in these two regions (Table 11). 
In terms of country commitments by development raking, Christian organizations 
concentrate  roughly 60% their projects in middle developed areas (as defined by Human 
Development Index scores of greater than .5, but less than .8). This result does not vary 
by index level (Table 12).  Based on these two tables, there is no evidence to suggest that 
more overtly religious Christian organizations, as measured by my ranking system, have 
different geographic priorities in comparison to nominally Christian FBOs.  
Next, I analyze the Christian category in terms of the four main categories: Catholic, 
Mainline Protestant , Faith-Founded,  and Evangelical. To test the degree to which the 
five hypotheses hold when controlling for various descriptors of the faith-based sector, I 
segment the regressions.  
Catholic FBOs. Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 papal encyclical, Rerum Novarum, denotes the 
beginning of modern teachings on social justice.54 The initial concepts outlined in this 
work provide the foundation for Vatican II’s formal move towards an emphasis on the 
alleviation of suffering and economic inequality. Today’s Catholic organizations stress 
promoting the sanctity of human life through the “alleviation of human suffering, the 
development of people and the fostering of charity and justice.”55 Six Catholic 
organizations are included in the dataset: Seton Institute, Hope For A Healthier 
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Humanity, Catholic Medical Mission Board, Inc., Salesian Missions, Covenant House, 
and Catholic Relief Services (USCCB).  
From the regression analysis in Table 15, I find strong support for recipient need, ease 
of working environment, and cultural congruency for the Catholic affiliated organizations 
included in the dataset (Hypotheses 1, 2, and 3). In terms of recipient need, Catholic 
FBOs select countries on the basis of high economic inequality. When tested jointly with 
GDP per capita and the components of HDI, the Gini Coefficient is highly significant 
with a positive sign.  Similarly to the aggregate selection model, Catholic organizations 
select work in countries with high levels of religious freedom as captured by the 
government index while the Freedom House variable, Pew Forum social index, and the 
dummy variable for banned organizations fail to be significant at the 5% level.  In terms 
of shared religious faith, all three measures of religious cultural congruency are 
statistically significant at the 1% level. There is no evidence to support of religiously 
persecuted minorities or influence of US foreign aid allocation or US foreign policy 
agenda on country selection. These results indicate that Catholic affiliated organizations 
are primarily motivated by measures economic inequality, religious freedom, and cultural 
congruency.  
Insert Table 14 about here 
Table 14 shows the regional distribution of country commitments by Catholic 
organizations in comparison to other affiliations. Forty percent of their country 
commitments are to Africa, followed closely by the Americas (30%). This finding 
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supports that the missionary history of Catholicism still impact the country selection 
choices made in the modern era.  
Mainline Protestant FBOs. The dataset includes 11 mainline protestant organizations. 
Five are the official development arm of their religion: Episcopal Relief and 
Development, The African Methodist Episcopal Church Service & Development Agency, 
Inc., Lutheran World Relief, Inc, United Methodist Committee on Relief of GBGM-
UMC, and Board of World Mission of the Moravian Church.  The average age of 
Mainline Protestant organizations is 77, in comparison to 38 years for the entire dataset. 
As established organizations, I expect these organizations to make safer choices, as 
measured by hypothesis 2. I also expect the shared religious tradition variable to be 
statistically significant since many of the Mainline groups are officially affiliated with an 
official religious denomination.  
Table 14. shows the geographic dispersion of Mainline Protestant FBOs. Fifty 
percent of all commitments are to African countries. This finding is substantively higher 
than other Christian denominations. As the official development arms of protestant 
denominations, the organizations in this sample share a past history of missions to Africa.  
The results of the regression analysis of country commitments can be found in 
Table 15. I find strong support for hypotheses of recipient need, shared religious 
tradition, and US official aid allocation (Hypotheses 1,3, and 5). Economic indicators of 
recipient need are highly significant. The results of hypothesis 2 and 4 are inconclusive, 
with the coefficients of the two measures of religious freedom conflicting. Cultural 
congruency, in the form of shared religious tradition and past colonial history are also 
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motivators for mainline FBOs. Additionally, US foreign aid allocation is a significant at 
the 1% level with a positive coefficient.  
Faith Founded FBOs. Faith Founded organizations are loosely based on Christian 
values, in comparison to the previous category which mainly includes the official 
development arms of denominations.  McCleary notes that this category “captures a 
recent change in the religion scene, namely, the rise of agencies that are neither 
evangelical nor denominational but that adhere to broad Christian values” (2009). As a 
result, these organizations tend to be newer organizations. In addition to being newer 
organizations, the majority of the Faith Founded FBOs also are USAID fund recipients. 
Sixteen of the nineteen Faith Founded FBOs depended on the federal government to 
some extent. Faith Founded FBOs include World Vision and Church World Service.  
Based on these characteristics, I hypothesize that these organizations will be more 
likely to follow US official aid as a consequence of being highly federally funded. In 
addition, as newer FBOs, faith founded FBOs will make ‘riskier’ decisions, choosing to 
work environments with lower levels of political rights and civil liberties (Freedom 
House) or lower levels of religious freedom. I also expect the variables for cultural 
congruence to have less significance, since these organizations are only ‘loosely’ based 
on Christian values (McCleary 2009). 
The recipient need and shared religious tradition hypotheses are supported by the 
regression analysis. Again, I find strong support for recipient need, as both the Gini 
Coefficient and GDP per capita are highly significant. As hypothesized, I find little 
evidence to suggest that faith founded organizations take religious freedom or other 
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measures of rule of law, political rights, and civil liberties into account. When tested 
jointly, these measures are all statistically insignificant at the 5% level (Table 15). Only 
the proportional measure of shared religious tradition is highly significant, in comparison 
to the majority and plurality dummies. I do not find the variable for US foreign aid 
allocation to be significant, even though a large proportion of faith founded organizations 
receive USAID funding.  
Evangelical FBOs.  
"We analyze every project, every program we undertake, to make sure that within that 
program evangelism is a significant component. We cannot feed individuals and then let 
them go to hell."  
 
— Ted Engstrom, former president of World Vision International (Hancock 1989)56 
 
Evangelical FBOs comprise the bulk of the FBO sector and command almost 40% of 
its resources. These groups have experienced a large amount of growth, in terms of sheer 
number and revenue, within the last 20 years, driving the rise in prominence of the FBO 
sector (McCleary 2009). The number of Evangelical organizations has risen from ten in 
the 1980’s to almost 90 by 2005. In terms of financial power, these organizations 
command 20% of the entire PVO sector (encompassing both faith-based and secular 
organizations).   
In comparison to the other faith categories, Evangelical FBOs emphasize sharing a 
religious message to non-Christians around the world (McCleary 2009). McCleary codes 
evangelical PVOs by an explicit desire to spread their faith. While many evangelical 
organizations simply stress the need to share the Gospel, others have a structured means 
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for identifying countries on the basis of need for Christianity. In a personal interview, the 
director of Africa programs at World Help noted his group’s organizational policy to 
target programs and aid toward the ‘10/40 window.’ The 10/40 Window refers to the 
geographic region from 10 degrees to 40 degrees North of the equator. This area of the 
world, encompassing the Middle East, North Africa, and Asia, contains the largest 
population of non-Christians. 57 In addition, this area of the world also contains the 
countries with the lowest levels of religious freedom. 
On the basis of faith affiliation, some politicians have contested the role of 
evangelical faith-based organizations. These critics argue that the first priority of these 
organizations is to spread their faith and to maintain a staunchly conservative position.58 
The recent example of Christian missionaries in Haiti charged with kidnapping children 
illustrates these concerns. As such as substantial player in the faith-based sector, and 
arguably, development NGOs in general, it is essential to understand how these 
organizations operate.  
Evangelical PVOs spread the bulk of their country commitments between Africa, the 
Americas, and Asia (Table 14). Based on this Table, I find no evidence to support that 
Evangelicals target their aid recipients differently than other Christian denominations in 
term of geographic distribution. The results of the regression analysis for evangelical 
FBOs can be found in Table 15. Evangelical organizations are highly motivated by 
recipient need, religious freedom, religious congruency, and US foreign aid allocation. 
When tested individually, Freedom House and the government and social ratings for 
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religious freedom are significant with negative coefficients, indicating a preference to 
work in freer environments. Tested jointly, measures of government restrictions on 
religious freedom trump other measures as in the aggregate selection model. Measures 
for shared religious tradition were highly significant. Based on the empirical analysis, 
there is no evidence to support that Evangelical organizations operate on the basis of 
religious demography, targeting non-Christian regions of the world. On the contrary, the 
results indicate the Evangelicals seek to work in countries with a larger portion of fellow 
Christians.  
Overall, all Christian organizations concentrate their development efforts in Africa 
and Latin America. Christian FBOs are motivated by economic measures of recipient 
need (GDP per capita and the Gini Coefficient) and shared religious tradition.  
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5. Implications 
As we have seen, many factors are at play when analyzing the FBO sector. How 
should scholars, academic, and development practitioners proceed when studying the 
FBO sector? I argue that affiliation between Christian and Non-Christian FBOs is the 
first place to start. While the tenets of non-Christian organizations vary tremendously, 
their motivations for country selection do not. Based on the analysis, Non-Christian 
organizations are primarily motivated by recipient country religious demography, helping 
countries with a significant portion of the co-adherents.  
How should scholars disaggregate the Christian FBO sector? Separating by affiliation 
is not the appropriate next step. I propose a more complete structure by which future 
researchers should analyze the FBO sector. Based on empirical findings and personal 
interviews, I argue that the Christian FBO sector must be analyzed with respect to both 
total annual revenue and the presence of affiliation with formal denominations (see 
Figure 2). Both of these dimensions are essential to understanding not only the 
geographic distribution of country commitments, but also the organizational structure 
through which a FBO comes to make those decision and the mechanisms they work 
through to identify recipients and distribute aid.  
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High Annual Revenue 
Official  Affiliated Development Arm   Unofficial 
- Older, established 
organizations 
- Choices dictated by 
historical roots and 
missionary history 
- Identify aid recipients 
through official church 
networks  
- Formalized Selection 
Process 
 
 
 
Examples: Episcopal Relief and 
Development 
- Highest total annual 
revenue 
- High government 
funding and 
implementers of USAID 
programs 
- Works mainly through 
government contracts 
- Largest players in the 
aid industry 
- Formalized Selection 
process 
 
Examples: World Vision 
- Less government funding 
- Identify aid recipients 
through official church 
network 
- Rely on private, church 
donations to sustain 
projects 
- Informal Selection 
Process 
 
 
Examples: Five Talents 
- Work through vetting 
individual missionaries, 
religious leaders, 
pastors, or local NGOs 
- Emphasis on personal 
relationships 
- Less government 
funding 
- Informal Selection 
Process 
 
Examples: World Help, 
Christian Relief Services 
Low Annual Revenue 
Figure 2. FBOs by Revenue and relationship with an official affiliation 
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The first lens through which to analyze the FBO sector is affiliation with an 
official denomination (Ferris 2005, 313). This association changes the fundamental way 
in which an organization operates and impacts the mechanisms used to select recipients 
and individuals projects. Official development arms of a religion use a structured, 
formalized means of selecting where to work and identifying aid recipients. 
Organizations with official ties are limited to locations with an existing official church 
network. For example, Five Talents, a microfinance organization affiliated with the 
Anglican Church, works in conjunction with the diocese of the host recipient country. 
Not only does the organization obtain permission from the Anglican Church to operate, 
but they also use the church network as the main means for identifying aid recipients.59 
Due to the means of operation, the FBO’s geographic distribution reflects that of their 
official faith.  
Secondly, officially affiliated organizations are subject to an additional level of 
accountability from their affiliated religion. Along with this accountability comes the 
mission to support brethren and the global church network. For modeling purposes, using 
religious demography as a predictor variable acts a proxy for the presence of a diocese or 
other network. However, unaffiliated groups rely on personal relationships that are 
inherently intangible and do not lend themselves to quantitative analysis. 
Unaffiliated organizations operate primarily through personal relationships. These 
organizations first identify either an individual pastor, mission group, or local NGO in 
which to funnel aid through. The identification process relies on networks, connections, 
and trust. For example, the Director of Africa programs at World Help personally travels 
                                                           
59
 Craig Cole, President, Five Talents, Phone Conversation, February 5, 2010. 
79 
 
to find trustworthy individuals to partner. This step is crucial because World Help do not 
have local staff on the ground to supervise projects. For these organizations, it is 
especially important to vet trustworthy individuals to partner with overseas, since there is 
little oversight by the FBO. The organization relies on pictures and other tangible pieces 
of evidence to verify their money is well spent. 60 
In both means of operation, a connection of same faith between the donor and 
recipient is needed, supporting the hypothesis of cultural congruency. However, this does 
not imply that these organizations only work in environments of the same faith. The 
President of Five Talents stressed that the existence of a diocese acts a point of opening. 
Through this, his organization has been able to set up projects in Indonesia and Sudan, 
two Muslim majority countries.61  
The second dimension of total annual revenue captures logistical restrictions that 
impact not only the means of which organizations operate through, but also where they 
ultimately select to work. Total annual revenue impacts not only the staff and resources 
available to a FBO, but also the level of USAID funding, if any, and the number of 
country commitments per organization. These relationships are confirmed by the 
correlation between total annual revenue and these other organization characteristics.  
Total annual revenue is significantly correlated with number of country commitments 
(ρ=.224, p-value=.011), federal government revenue (ρ =.644, p-value=.000), and age (ρ 
=.368, p-value=0.00). Since each are positively correlated, as total annual revenue 
increases, so does the number of country commitments, federal government revenue, and 
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age of the organization. Using this variable as a factor to segment the sector is also 
helpful due to the correlates of annual revenue. 
The country selection process varies with revenue as well. Larger organizations 
are more likely to have a structured process, with a formal review of projects taking place 
on a yearly basis. According to Koch (2007), 40% of NGOs surveyed had a formalized 
selection process. In this formalized method, organizations may use development 
indicators or measures of poverty to guide them in the process. However, in personal 
interviews, several development practitioners noted the limitations of relying on 
quantitative measures alone. A project coordinator at World Concern noted that 
development indicators fail to recognize places like Vietnam that have “fallen off the 
radar” for development organizations. While Vietnam is advanced according to some 
standards, but there are large, vulnerable populations, such as minority ethnic groups and 
those with disabilities that are overlooked by country level indicators.62 In contrast, 
smaller organizations may act in a more ad hoc manner, selecting to work on countries 
based upon opportunities that arise. These organizations may be more influenced by back 
donors, following where funding is available.   
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6. Limitations 
 This exploratory empirical analysis of US based FBOs involved in international is 
by no means an exhaustive study. First and foremost, the analysis is only as good as the 
data available. There is no universal directory of FBOs. As a proxy, I utilized the USAID 
PVO registry as the population of interest. Consequently, the analysis is biased towards 
organizations who select to have a relationship with the federal government. 63 
Additionally, the analysis based on publically available information. 
Measurement errors in coding may impact the analysis. I required an explicit evidence of 
organization involvement (either through funding, volunteers, or projects) in order to 
code an organization as involved in a country. The nature of the coding of the dependent 
variable may underestimate long term projects, and does not account for involvement 
over time. Moreover, I cannot control for the historical involvement of FBOs in a specific 
country or regions. With the presence of a time series dataset, the lagged dependent 
variable could be included as a predictor variable. The analysis was also at the disposal of 
the availability of development indicators. Interesting recipient countries, such as 
Afghanistan and Iraq are not included in the analysis due to the lack of information on 
population, economic, and political indicators.  
Lack of allocation information also is a flaw of this analysis. The selection model 
tells us where organizations choose to work, but does not speak to the weigh an 
organization gives to a chosen project. The lack of readily available data on dispersal of 
funds is an obvious limitation in this research. Dichotomous coding only tells part of the 
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story. In this research, each country commitment has equal weight. In reality, this is not 
the case. Organizations have many projects in all corners of the globe, but funding 
allocation gives insight into the weight and importance of each project.  
Problems with quantitative analysis also limit the predictive power of the 
quantitative analysis. Post estimation diagnostics indicate the presence of specification 
error indicating that at least one necessary independent variable is not included. From the 
proceeding discussion of the lens through which to analyze organizations, I suspect that 
the lack of the ability to quantify personal relationships plagues the empirical analysis. 
Additional research and data collection is needed on this topic. However, as an 
exploratory study and the first empirical examine of FBOs of its kind, this research may 
act as a springboard for future analysis, both quantitative and field driven.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
83 
 
7. Suggestions for future research 
 Many additional research questions and areas of study remain concerning FBOs 
and international development. First, with allocation information, the weight of country 
commitments could be examined. Do organizations place more value on some types of 
projects (such as health, development, education) over others? Do some geographic areas 
receive more funding than others? What motivates these decisions? 
With project level data, scholars and academics could have a more decisive 
analysis in answering the questions raised in the hypotheses. Ease of working 
environment (hypothesis 2), would be an interesting path for future research. While this 
study could address ease of working environment at the country level, project level data 
would allow scholars to address hypotheses at a local level. Do organizations select their 
working environment and communities by proximity to resources, roads, ease of 
transportation? In addition, GIS techniques could be applied to create a mapping of FBO 
involvement. Aid workers on the ground commonly note that organizations choose to 
work in ‘easier’ environments, such as locations close to roads and cities for  not only 
ease of transportation of goods, but also to attract and retain volunteers.64Project level 
data would allow scholars to refine the results of this country level analysis, determining 
exactly which communities and villages receive FBO aid.   
With project level data, scholars would able to do network analysis by analyzing 
partnerships of FBOs. An investigation of who works with whom would be valuable. Do 
FBOs partner with secular NGOs or governmental organizations, or do they limit 
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interactions to organizations with similar values to their own? To what extent to US 
based FBOs partner with local NGOs? What impact does this have on the quality of aid 
delivered? Answers to these questions are only possible with comprehensive data. Panel 
data at the project level would open up new avenues of future research. To make any of 
these future areas of research possible, academics and practitioners must work together to 
encourage transparency. In the wake of interagency competition, this is difficult to 
encourage. Only through creating the right set of incentives will FBOs be motivated to 
share information. 65  
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8. Conclusion  
In summary, this paper outlines the first, to the knowledge of the author, 
empirically based study of US based FBOs involved in international development. I 
contribute a unique dataset describing aid commitments of 129 FBOs in 114 countries 
during 2006. The research identified the key factors that explain country level aid 
commitment by FBOs and the degree to which they influence the geographic dispersion 
of country level aid commitments. For the sector as a whole, FBOs are influenced by 
three main factors: economic measures of recipient need, shared cultural values, and 
official US aid allocation. Importantly, this finding holds when considering small and 
large, USAID funded and non-funded organizations alike. Within the faith-based sector, 
Non-Christian FBOs are driven first and foremost by shared religious tradition, favoring 
their co-adherents above all else. Christian NGOs factor in economic need into their 
decision making process. The empirical analysis allows us to make inferences on the 
hypotheses and illuminates the preferences of the industry.   
Based on these empirical results, I outline a new lens through which to analyze 
the FBO sector for future scholars, describing the necessary characteristics to consider 
when discussing the FBO sector. Consideration of both the resources available to an 
organization (measured in terms of total annual revenue) and the organization’s 
relationship with an established demonization are essential when discussing US based 
FBOs involved in international development.  
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Recent policy indicates that charitable choice in international development is here 
to stay (Slack 2009). On the campaign trail, then candidate Obama stressed the 
importance of FBOs: 
That's why Washington needs to draw on them [FBOs]. The fact is, the challenges we face 
today - from saving our planet to ending poverty - are simply too big for government to solve 
alone. We need all hands on deck….What I'm saying is that we all have to work together - 
Christian and Jew, Hindu and Muslim; believer and non-believer alike - to meet the 
challenges of the 21st century.66 
Once in office, the Obama administration has maintained the previous administration’s 
faith-based initiatives, rebranding it Office of Faith-based and Neighborhood 
Partnerships. The findings of this exploratory research indicate that governmental 
relationships with FBOs are founded. FBOs consider economic measures of recipient 
need and are not influenced by the biases that plague official US foreign aid. Based on 
this analysis, the conclusion that “NGOs do better” is, in terms of motivation and criteria 
for recipient selection, confirmed for the faith-based sector. Now the next stage of 
research is upon us. Scholars and aid practitioners must take the research to the next level 
and evaluate the effectiveness of aid. The question remains if’ purer’ motivations for 
selecting aid recipients, motivations that are driven by recipient need, translate into 
better, more effective aid. 
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Appendix 1. Charts and Tables. 
Region 
Number 
of 
Recipient 
Countries 
in 
Sample 
Share of 
World 
Population 
Share of 
World's 
Christians 
Share of 
World's 
Muslims 
US 
Foreign 
Aid 
Allocation, 
in billions 
(FY 2005) 
NGO Aid 
Allocation, in 
dollars(Koch 
2006) 
FBO Dataset, 
in country 
commitments 
(N=129) 
Africa 40 13.70% 29.60% 16.87% 32.52% 37.03% 35.74% 
Asia 21 66.72% 23.65% 55.27% 21.32% 26.42% 23.44% 
Europe 11 1.96% 6.57% 0.11% 3.44% 6.93% 5.20% 
Americas 26 10.67% 38.28% 0.16% 6.48% 22.63% 28.74% 
MENA 16 6.95% 1.90% 27.59% 36.24% 6.99% 6.89% 
Total 114 5,023,405,673 1,315,034,563 1,104,103,170 $68,830.82  €4,594,790,759 1886 
 
Table 1. Geographic distribution of FBO country commitments in comparison to US foreign aid allocation 
and NGO aid allocation 
  Faith Affiliation    
Project Type Secular Faith-based Total 
Agriculture 226 115 341 
  8.30% 11.30%   
Capacity Building 564 112 676 
  20.72% 11.00%   
Civil Society 345 86 431 
  12.67% 8.45%   
Education 494 178 672 
  18.15% 17.49%   
Environment 145 14 159 
  5.33% 1.38%   
Health 533 256 789 
  19.58% 25.15%   
Humanitarian Assistance 171 153 324 
  6.28% 15.03%   
Infrastructure 49 32 81 
  1.80% 3.14%   
Private Enterprise 195 72 267 
  7.16% 7.07%   
Total 2722 1018 3740 
  100.00% 100.00%   
Chi-Square= 167.38; p-value = 0.00 
Table 2.  Number of projects by Secular and FBOs (Flanigan 2010) 
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Dataset (N=129) 
Mean Standard dev. Min Max 
Age 38.27132 40.75551 1 260 
Total Annual Revenue $67,700,000 $164,000,000 $92,742 $905,000,000 
Federal Government Annual Revenue $6,821,171 $6,821,171 0 $335,000,000 
Index (Christian affiliated only) 2.122807 1.317952 0 5 
Country Commitments 14.73 15.37 1 78 
McCleary Dataset (N=179) 
Age 45.18436 98.74547 0 906 
Total Annual Revenue $51,500,000 $134,000,000 0 $905,000,000 
Federal Government Annual Revenue $4,836,575 $2,8400,000 $335,000,000 
Table 3. Organization Specific Variables, Summary Statistics 
 
 
 
Age of the Organization 
Region 
Less than 
10 years 
10 to 30 
years 
30 to 50 
years 
50 years 
and older Total 
Africa 34.4% 35.3% 33.33% 37.7% 674 
Asia 24.2% 24.88% 25.16% 21.0% 442 
Europe 3.3% 4.61% 5.35% 6.4% 98 
Latin America 29.5% 29.80% 30.50% 26.6% 542 
MENA 8.61% 5.38% 5.66% 8.32% 130 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1886 
N 244 651 381 673 
Chi-square= 15.8789; p-value=.197 
Table 4 Effect of age on aid commitments by region 
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Age of Organization 
Development Level 
Less than 
10 years 
10 to 30 
years 
30 to 50 
years 
50 years 
and older Total 
Very High and High 15.2% 19.5% 18.9% 21.8% 35 
Medium 63.9% 59.6% 60.4% 55.4% 1109 
Low and Other 20.9% 20.9% 20.8% 22.7% 406 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1886 
N 244 651 318 673 
Table 5 Effect of age on aid commitments by development level 
Chi-square = 7.981 
p-value = .239 
 
 
 
Percentage of Government Funding 
Region None 
Less than 
10%  10-20% 
Greater 
than 20% Total 
Africa 35.4% 34.5% 34.3% 40.2% 674 
Asia 23.5% 23.0% 19.7% 26.2% 442 
Europe 4.5% 5.0% 16.1% 2.3% 21 
Latin America 29.1% 32.2% 23.4% 21.9% 67 
MENA 7.58% 5.30% 6.57% 9.30% 24 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 1886 
N 712 736 137 301 
Table 6 Effect of government funding on aid commitments by region 
Chi-square = 56.73 
p-value = 0.00 
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Table 7 Top Recipient of Official US Aid (from OECD statistics for 2005) 
Country US Official Aid, 2005 (in 
millions 
Number of FBOs committed 
Sudan 758.97 31 
Ethiopia 679.17 37 
Egypt 601.19 11 
Colombia 455.16 15 
Jordan 357.7 11 
Israel 357 11 
Country Number of FBOs 
committed not receiving 
government funds 
Number of FBOs committed 
receiving government funds 
Sudan 
 
41.9% 58.1% 
Ethiopia 
 
29.7% 70.3% 
Egypt 
 
45.5% 54.5% 
Colombia 40.0% 60.0% 
Jordan 45.5% 54.5% 
Israel 54.5% 45.5% 
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Table 8. Effect of government funding on aid commitments by development level 
Recipient of Federal Government Funding? 
Region Yes No Total 
Very High 1.9% 1.8% 35 
High 17.7% 18.0% 336 
Medium 58.6% 59.1% 1109 
Low 20.4% 19.1% 375 
Other 1.45% 1.97% 31 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
N 1174 712 1886 
Chi-square=1.1195; 
p-value=.981 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9. Effect of government funding on aid commitments by region 
Recipient of Federal Government Funding? 
Region Yes No Total 
Africa 35.9% 35.4% 674 
Asia 23.4% 23.5% 442 
Europe 5.6% 4.5% 98 
Latin America 28.5% 29.1% 542 
MENA 6.47% 7.58% 130 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
N 1174 712 1886 
Chi-square=1.96;     
p-value=.743 
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Table 10. Effect of rhetoric ("Poorest of the Poor") on aid commitments by 
development level 
"Poorest" 
Region No "Poorest" Total 
Very High 1.8% 2.0% 35 
High 17.8% 17.6% 336 
Medium 58.6% 60.3% 1109 
Low 20.1% 18.1% 375 
Other 1.60% 2.01% 31 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
N 1687 199 1886 
Chi-square=0.66  
p-value = .956 
 
 
Table 11. Effect of affiliation on aid commitments by region 
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Table 12. Effect of ‘religiosity’ on aid commitments by region (Christian organizations only) 
 
 
Table 13. Effect of ‘religiosity’ on aid commitments by region (Christian organizations only) 
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Table 14. Effect of affiliation on aid commitments by region 
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Religious Affiliation 
Variables Islamic Jewish Catholic 
Mainline 
Protestant 
Faith 
Founded Evangelical 
Population(logged)   + + + + + 
Revenue (logged) - + + + + 
Disaster, dummy +         + 
Hypothesis 1: Recipient Need 
GDP/capita(logged)     - - - - 
HDI + + 
Gini +   + + + + 
Hypothesis 2: Maximizing Success 
Freedom House             
Social Restriction on Religion + + 
Ban, dummy             
Gov’t restriction on religion - - - - 
Hypothesis 3: Cultural 
Congruency             
Religious Demography + + + + + 
Colony, Dummy       + + + 
Hypothesis 4: Persecuted 
Minorities 
Minority, dummy       +   + 
Hypothesis 5: Non-Governmental Orgs? 
Israel, Dummy             
Egypt, Dummy - 
US Official Aid       +   + 
+ denoted that the variable is significant at the 5% level with a positive coefficient 
-  denotes that the variable is significant at the 5% level with a negative coefficient 
Table 15. Significance of Coefficients for logistic regression by religious affiliation 
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Appendix 2. Faith-based organizations, coded by religion (McCleary 2009) 
Code Number Category N Percentage 
1 Mainline Protestant 13 7.26 
2 Roman Catholic 14 7.82 
3 Orthodox 2 1.12 
4 Faith-Founded Christian 24 13.41 
5 Ecumenical Christian 11 6.15 
6 Other Christian 0 0 
7 Evangelical 88 49.16 
8 Jewish 9 5.03 
9 Muslim 4 2.23 
10  Hindu 3 1.68 
11 Buddhist 1 .56 
12 Jain 1 .56 
13 Interfaith 3 1.68 
14 Other religion 6 3.35 
Total  179 100 
Definitions (McCleary 2009): 
Faith-Founded: organizations are “those based on religious principles or values but with no formal 
affiliation with an organized religion…Christian organizations were identified as faith-founded Christian 
when they held that their religious values came from no particular denomination of a religion.” McCleary 
notes that this category “captures a recent change in the religion scene, namely, the rise of agencies that are 
neither evangelical nor denominational but that adhere to broad Christian values.” 
Ecumenical :“Christian agencies based on at least two specific Protestant denominations are classified as 
ecumenical Christian” 
Interfaith: “PVOs classified as interfaith are formed by at least two distinct major religious or spiritual 
traditions, not all Christian” 
Catholic: Used the following sources for coding purposes: Catholic Network of Volunteer Service, U.S. 
Catholic Conference of Bishops, and the Official Catholic Directory.  
Mainline Protestant: Includes black Protestant churches, and Unitarian Universal Association 
Evangelical: Includes the Vineyard Church. “Evangelical PVOs are characterized by their doctrine, which 
emphasizes evangelicalism. As a group, they accept basic tenets: the inerrancy of the Bible and its authority 
as the sole source of God’s word; the deity of Jesus as Christ and personal salvation through him; the 
sharing of the conversion experience with others; and or pre-post millennium beliefs” 
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Appendix 3. Sources of variables 
Variable Name Description Source 
Ban Dummy variable for countries with a ban on foreign 
missionaries (Burma(Myanmar), Iran, Kuwait, Libya, 
Maldives, Mauritania, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Qatar, and Indonesia) 
Pew Forum, 2009 
Colony Coded for US colonial involvement (Philippines, Haiti, 
Nicaragua) 
Dollar and Levin (2000) 
Disaster Coded for natural disaster during 2004-2006 (Indonesia, 
Philippines, Pakistan) 
  
FH Freedom House score, sum of civil and political liberties, on a 
scale from 1-14 
Freedom House, 2005 
GDP per 
capita 
Gross Domestic Product per capita UN, 2005 
Gini Gini coefficient, describing economic inequality UN, 2005 
GRI Government restrictions on religion Pew Forum 
103 
 
HDI Human Development Index UN, 2005 
Minorities at 
Risk 
The variable of interest in the dataset is: CULPO1: 
“Restrictions on religion”. I coded the group if “Activity 
informally restricted (The activity is restricted by widespread 
but informal social practice (e.g., by discrimination against 
people who follow group religion)”, Activity somewhat 
restricted, or Activity sharply restricted. This corresponds to 
codes 1, 2, or 3. 
Gurr, University of 
Maryland, 2004-2006 
Population Total population World Bank, 2005 
ReligMatch1 Coded 1 if same religion match (majority), coded 0 for 
different 
World Christian 
Database and McCleary 
Dataset 
ReligMatch2 Coded 1 if same religion match (plurality), coded 0 for 
different 
World Christian 
Database and McCleary 
Dataset 
ReligMatch3 Percent same religions affiliates World Christian 
Database and McCleary 
Dataset 
RevGov Proportion of total revenue coming from federal funds or 
grants in FY05 
USAID VOLAG 2007 
Revtot Total revenue in FY05 USAID VOLAG, 2007 
104 
 
SRI Social restrictions on religion Pew Forum 
U.S. Foreign 
Aid 
Official development assistance and official aid (current US$) OECD, 2005 
WB1 Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism: measures the perceptions of the 
likelihood that the government will be destabilized or 
overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including 
domestic violence and terrorism 
World Bank, Good 
Governance Indicator, 
2005 
WB2 Government Effectiveness: measures the quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its 
independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies 
World Bank, Good 
Governance Indicator, 
2005 
WB3 Rule of Law: measures the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, in particular 
the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, 
as well as the likelihood of crime and violence 
World Bank, Good 
Governance Indicator, 
2005 
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Appendix 4. List of countries included in analysis (N=114) 
Algeria 
Argentina 
Bangladesh 
Belize 
Benin 
Bolivia 
Botswana 
Brazil 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon 
Cape Verde 
Central African 
Republic 
Chile 
China 
Colombia 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 
Congo, Rep. 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
El Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Ethiopia 
Fiji 
Gabon 
Gambia, The 
Ghana 
Grenada 
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Honduras 
Hungary 
India 
Indonesia 
Israel 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Kenya 
Korea, Rep. 
Kuwait 
Lao PDR 
Latvia 
Lebanon 
Liberia 
Lithuania 
Macedonia, FYR 
Madagascar 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives 
Mali 
Malta 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico 
Moldova 
Morocco 
Mozambique 
Namibia 
Nepal 
Nicaragua 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Oman 
Pakistan 
Panama 
Papua New Guinea 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Philippines 
Poland 
Romania 
Rwanda 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal 
Seychelles 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore 
Slovenia 
Somalia 
South Africa 
Sri Lanka 
Sudan 
Suriname 
Swaziland 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Tajikistan 
Tanzania 
Thailand 
Togo 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
Uganda 
Uruguay 
Uzbekistan 
Venezuela, RB 
Vietnam 
West Bank and Gaza 
Yemen, Rep. 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
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Appendix 6. Regression Tables 
Table 1. Logistic Regression results 
  (1) (2) (3) (3a) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  Base Model Hypothesis 1- Recipient Need Hypothesis 2- Difficult Environment 
(log)GDP/capita -0.246 -0.335 -0.636 -0.327 -0.198 -0.252 -0.198 
  ( -10.92)*** ( -8.44)*** (-9.20 )*** (-13.1)*** ( -8.73)*** (-11.12)** (-6.50)*** 
(log)Population 0.334 0.343 0.361 0.367 0.365 0.360 0.442 0.367 0.415 
  (20.00)*** (  20.79)***   (19.5)*** (19.02)*** ( 18.96)*** (21.02)*** ( 22.47 )*** (18.94)** ( 19.72)*** 
(log)Revenue 0.244 0.246 0.240 0.242 0.245 0.246 0.247 0.244 0.247 
  (19.41 )*** (  19.73)*** ( 18.75 )*** ( 18.46)*** (18.58)*** ( 19.5)*** ( 19.49)*** ( 19.41)** (  19.50)** 
Disaster, 
dummy 0.281 0.310 0.432 0.395 0.354 0.220 0.403 0.403 0.448 
  (2.29)** (   2.51  )** (  3.59  )*** (3.15)*** ( 2.80)*** ( 1.78 )* ( 3.25)*** (3.14)*** ( 3.28)*** 
HDI   -1.251 2.746 
    (   -8.03)*** ( 5.91)*** 
Gini   0.040 0.047 0.047 
    (  12.51 )*** ( 13.39)*** (  13.44)*** 
Life Expectancy   0.013   
    ( 3.07)***   
ReligMatch_1 
(majority)     
      
ReligMatch_2 
(plurality)     
      
ReligMatch_3 
(proportion)     
      
Freedom House     -0.068 -0.007 
      ( -7.69)***            ( -0.56) 
Gov’t restriction 
on religion     -0.165 -0.157 
      (-11.19)***      (-6.62)*** 
Social 
restriction on 
religion     -0.046 0.031 
         (-3.35)***              (1.84) 
Ban on 
missionaries, 
Dummy     -0.4582 
                 (-2.5)* 
Colony, 
Dummy     
      
Minority_1, 
Dummy     
      
Official Aid     
      
Egypt, Dummy     
      
Israel, Dummy     
      
Constant -9.42839 -10.76 -13.514 -12.125 -10.634 -8.721 -11.2056 -9.80841 -10.813 
  ( -23.16)*** ( -28.7)*** 
( -30.49 
)*** (-25.09)*** (  -19.9)*** (-21.02)*** 
( -
25.44)** (-23.20)*** (-21.09)*** 
Pseudo R^2 0.0991 0.0952 0.0873 0.0989 0.1032 0.1047 0.1114 0.1001 0.1126 
N 14190 14448 12384 11868 11868 14190 14190 14190 14190 
BIC 9862.6 10070.3 9340.27 8909.98 8819.59 9810.79 9737.88 9860.77 9754.22 
log likelihood -4907.4 -5011.21 -4646.57 -4422.15 -4376.96 -4876.71 -4840.26 -4901.7 -4834.09 
% Correct 87.03% 87.09% 85.61% 85.47% 85.58% 87.00% 87.03% 87.06% 87.04% 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 1. Logistic Regression results, continued 
  (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
  Hypothesis 3-Cultural Congruency 
Hypothesis 4- 
Minority 
      
(log)GDP/Capita -0.252 -0.235 -0.226 -0.240 -0.219 -0.245 
  (-11.09 )*** ( -10.27)*** ( -9.93)*** ( -10.43)*** ( -9.43)*** ( -10.77)*** 
(log)Population 0.339 0.347 0.356 0.356 0.377 0.320 
  ( 20.19)*** ( 20.54)*** ( 21.05)*** ( 20.71)*** ( 21.73)*** ( 18.82 )*** 
(log)Revenue 0.242 0.242 0.241 0.248 0.244 0.245 
  ( 19.17)*** ( 19.21)*** ( 19.00)*** ( 19.51)*** (19.09)*** ( 19.43)*** 
Disaster, dummy 0.27085 0.29364 0.31909 -0.18324 -0.14146 0.3418223 
  ( 2.20)** ( 2.38)** (  2.58 )** ( -1.39) ( -1.07) (2.77)*** 
HDI     
      
Gini     
      
Life expectancy     
      
ReligMatch_1 
(majority) 0.758   
  (5.97)***   
ReligMatch_2, 
(plurality)   0.699   
    (8.14)***   
ReligMatch_3 
(proportion)   1.590 1.590 
    ( 11.00)*** ( 10.84)*** 
Freedom House     
      
Gov’t restriction 
on religion     
      
Social restriction 
on religion     
      
Ban, Dummy     
      
Colony, Dummy   1.320 1.319 
    ( 12.43)*** (12.28)*** 
Minority_1, 
Dummy     0.718 
      ( 6.51)*** 
Official Aid     
      
Egypt, Dummy     
      
Israel, Dummy     
      
Constant -9.450 -9.756 -10.068 -9.945 -10.587 -9.249 
  (-23.17)*** (-23.68)*** (-24.26 )*** (-23.92)*** ( -24.97)*** (-22.54)*** 
      
Pseudo R^2 0.102 0.1046 0.1092 0.1116 0.1215 0.1027 
N 14190 14190 14190 14190 14190 14190 
BIC 9840.4 9811.67 9761.65 9736.05 9637.85 9832.991 
log likelihood -4891.52 -4877.16 -4852.14 -4839.34 -4785.46 -4887.815 
% Correct 87.08% 87.08% 87.10% 87.25% 87.26% 87.00% 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
z-values in parentheses 
Dependent variable equals 1 if organization is active in country, 0 otherwise 
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Table 1. Logistic Regression results (continued) 
  (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
  Hypothesis 5- Nongovernmental? Full Model 
    
(log)GDP/Capita -0.195 -0.242 -0.250 -0.174 -0.629 -0.330 
  (  -7.76)*** ( 10.74)*** ( 10.95)*** (-6.71)*** (-7.80)*** ( -6.57)*** 
(log)Population 0.300 0.341 0.335 0.301 0.404 0.395 
  (16.99)*** ( 20.26)*** (19.99)** ( 17.00)*** (16.92)*** ( 16.37)*** 
(log)Revenue 0.242 0.245 0.244 0.243 0.243 0.240 
  ( 18.58)*** ( 19.42)*** ( 19.41)*** (18.62)*** (17.50)*** ( 17.38)*** 
Disaster, dummy 0.530 0.257 0.282 0.485 
  ( 3.70 )*** (  2.08)** (  2.29)** ( 3.38)*** 
HDI   2.951 
    (5.54)*** 
Gini   0.028 0.032 
    ( 5.87)*** (6.87)*** 
Life expectancy   0.014 
    ( 2.82)** 
ReligMatch_1 
(majority)   
    
ReligMatch_2   
 (plurality)   
ReligMatch_3   1.112 1.160 
 (Proportion)   ( 6.46)*** ( 6.65)*** 
Freedom House   -0.039 -.021 
    ( -2.88)**              (-2.20)** 
Gov’t restriction 
on religion   -0.078 -0.051 
    ( -3.04)*** (-1.99)** 
Social restriction 
on religion   
    
Ban, Dummy   
    
Colony, Dummy   0.764 0.851 
    (  6.74)*** ( 7.36)*** 
Minority_1, 
Dummy   0.457 0.402 
    ( 2.97)***          ( 2.72)*** 
Official Aid 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
  ( 4.66)** ( 6.48)*** ( 5.41)*** (5.48)*** 
Egypt, Dummy -0.989 -1.617 -0.744 -0.884 
  ( -3.08 )*** ( -4.84)*** ( -2.09)** (-2.49)** 
Israel, Dummy 0.348 -0.213 
  (-1.12) (-0.67) 
Constant -9.289 -9.563 -9.41341 -9.50358 -10.4231 -11.8468 
  (-22.05)*** (-23.38)*** (-23.10)*** (-22.41 )*** (-16.89)*** ( -19.75)*** 
    
Pseudo R^2 0.0932 0.1002 0.0992 0.0964 0.1195 0.1146 
N 12513 14190 14190 12513 10578 10578 
BIC 9114.63 9859.99 9871.02 9101.28 8014.06 8103.61 
log likelihood -4529.01 -4901.31 -4906.83 -4512.9 -3946.8 -4005.49 
% Correct 86.24% 87.05% 87.02% 86.22% 84.94% 84.90% 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
z-values in parentheses 
Dependent variable equals 1 if organization is active in country, 0 otherwise 
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Appendix 7. Allocation  
Initial NGO research has focused on building allocation models. However, 
explanatory variables may have a different effect during the selection stage versus the 
allocation stage. For example, Koch et al. (2008) finds that shared religious tradition 
between the majority of the recipient country and the NGO is a significant predictor 
during the selection process, but not the allocation process. On the other hand, measures 
of recipient need  are found to be important when deciding how much to allocate, but not 
the initial selection process.  
The most simple model for the second step of disbursal of funding is to use OLS 
regression. However, many scholars in this field warn against this method due to 
selection bias: “may generate sample-selection bias” (Bethelemy 2006). Selection bias 
will be especially problematic with overdispersion of the dependent variable (Koch et al 
2008). The dependent variable in the allocation dataset contains over 80% zero values. 
As discussed previously, 13 organization included in the dataset publish country by 
country funding. Two additional organizations, ADRA and World Vision, were added to 
the allocation dataset using Koch et al dataset (2006). In total, the dataset consists of 
1,710 observations (15 organizations in 114 countries).  These organization go above and 
beyond what is officially required to maintain tax exempt status and federal government 
funding. The public availability of disaggregated financial information (either at the 
country or project level) is not required by the federal government in order to maintain 
tax exempt status. Moreover, this information is not solicited by USAID in order to 
register as a PVO. “Financial viability” is the only condition for registration, as discussed 
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in the introduction.67  In practice, this requirement is generally satisfied by the 
organization through publishing a financial statement verified by a certified accounting 
firm. 
  Organizations tend to only provide the necessary information. As stated, the 
federal government does not require disaggregated, country level financial information. 
In addition, watchdog groups, such as GuideStar, Charity Navigator do not provide 
project aid level allocation information. These groups weight the bulk of their rankings 
on the breakdown of funding between overhead costs versus programming costs (see 
Smillie 1997 for discussion). A more extensive financial report is not rewarded, and thus, 
not worth the time and effort of the organization. As a consequence, many organizations 
do not maintain accounting records at the country or project level.  
What drives some organizations to release financial information, while others are 
reluctant to do so? Why do these organizations allocate resources to do so when it is not 
required? I assert that organization must believe that they have something to gain from 
publishing this information. Organizations can use disaggregated country and project 
level data to appeal to donors. Not only does it make the organization appear to be more 
financially transparent, but it also may demonstrate to the donor the types of recipients 
and projects are most important, and thus most heavily funded. For example, American 
Joint Jewish Distribution Committee publishes information in such a way that they 
believe it will appeal to their donors. The organization displays their country level aid 
budget in a table form in their annual reports directly alongside country level Jewish 
                                                           
67
 “Conditions for Registration for U.S. Organizations.” USAID. http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-
cutting_programs/private_voluntary_cooperation/conditions_us_organizations.pdf 
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population data. 68 This display demonstrates the organization’s commitment to their 
fellow adherents to their donors. A potential donor has tangible evidence from this 
publication that the organization’s aim is to help those of the same faith, as well as being 
responsive to the size of the population in a country, budgeting aid in proportion to the 
population of co-adherents in a country.  
Insert Table 16 about here. 
Before any empirical analysis is discussed, I will first describe the extent to which 
this subset of faith-based organizations is representative for the sector as a whole. The 
Table 16 contains the number of faith-based organized by religious affiliation for the 
dataset used in the selection model (N=129) and the allocation dataset (N=15). Similar to 
the selection model sample, the allocation subset is dominated by evangelical 
organizations, representing roughly 50% of each sample. Likewise, the subset is 
representative of the selection model subset in terms of level of religiosity of the 
Christian organizations. However, the allocation dataset is not representative for non-
Christian faith-based organizations, as it contains information on only one non-Christian 
organization, the American Joint Jewish Distribution Committee. In comparison, 84.92% 
of the selection dataset, respectively, are composed of non-Christian organizations. These 
groups represent several faiths, including Judaism, Buddhism, Islam and Jainism. In 
addition, the allocation dataset contains no Catholic organization. 
In terms of total annual revenue, the allocation dataset is representative of the 
sector as a whole. The allocation subset is dominated by a few very large organizations 
                                                           
68
 2005 and 2006 Annual Reports 
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and the distribution as a whole is skewed to the right. Four of the fifteen organizations 
have an annual income greater than $100 million dollars in FY 2005. However, the 
sample of organizations with allocation information is biased towards those who receive 
government funding. 54% of faith-based organizations registered as PVOs did not receive 
any government funding during 2005. In comparison, only three organizations that public 
allocation information do not receive funding from the government. It follows that the 
mean federal revenue for the allocation sample is greater than that for the sample used in 
the preceding analysis.  
In terms of country commitments, the organizations that release financial 
information have a with a sample mean of 23.13 and sample median of 13 country 
commitments per organization in comparison to the selection dataset with a mean of 
14.73 and sample median of 9, respectively. This finding is to be expected. If an 
organization goes to the extent to disaggregate their funding information, it is assumed 
that they organization is active in numerous geographic locations. Additionally, the 
allocation subset may have more country commitments and be more active in 
international development as a consequence of greater government funding.  
The regression analysis is repeated for the allocation dataset.  First, the logistic 
regression model is repeated. I find some discrepancies in the logistic regression model 
between the allocation subsample (N=15) and the complete dataset (N=129).  The biggest 
discrepancies occur in the hypothesis testing for recipient needs. The predictor variable 
for GDP per capita (logged) fails to remain statistically significant throughout the 
hypothesis testing or when tested individuals as the sole predictor of recipient need. 
However, the predictors for economic inequality and development are significant with the 
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expected signs.  In regards to hypothesis 5, The US foreign aid allocation is not 
statistically significant for this sample. Lastly, the disaster dummy variable fails to be 
significant in any model specification. Next, I estimate the allocation model using OLS, 
using the log of absolute aid allocation as the dependent variable (Koch 2006).  Again, 
GDP per capita (logged) is not statistically significant in testing the recipient need 
hypothesis.  
In summary, the allocation model provides weak verification of the results to the 
selection model for the entire analysis. I find strong support again for hypotheses 2 and 3. 
In terms of recipient need, organizations in the subsample appear to depend on measures 
of economic inequality when selecting the amount of funding to disburse. Moreover, US 
official foreign aid allocation fails to be significant, even though a majority of the 
organizations are recipients of USAID funding.  
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Selection Dataset N=129 
Mean Standard dev. Min Max 
Age 38.27132 40.75551 1 260 
Total Annual Revenue $67,700,000  $164,000,000  $92,742  $905,000,000  
 Government Annual Revenue $6,821,171  $6,821,171  0 $335,000,000  
Index (Christian affiliated only) 2.122807 1.317952 0 5 
Country Commitments 14.73 15.37 1 78 
Allocation Dataset N=15 
Age 44.66667 37.97681 8 125 
Total Annual Revenue $111,000,000  $232,000,000  $1,121,374  $905,000,000  
Government Annual Revenue $15,700,000  $43,200,000  0 $166,000,000  
Index (Christian affiliated only) 2.214286 0.9749613 0 5 
Country Commitments 23.13 20.25 4 65 
Table 16. Summary Statistics 
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